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We consider testing the ability of quantum network nodes to execute multi-round quantum pro-
tocols. Specifically, we examine protocols in which the nodes are capable of performing quantum
gates, storing qubits and exchanging said qubits over the network a certain number of times. We
propose a simple ping-pong test, which provides a certificate for the capability of the nodes to run
certain multi-round protocols. We first show that in the noise-free regime the only way the nodes
can pass the test is if they do indeed possess the desired capabilities. We then proceed to consider
the case where operations are noisy, and provide an initial analysis showing how our test can be
used to estimate parameters that allow us to draw conclusions about the actual performance of such
protocols on the tested nodes. Finally, we investigate the tightness of this analysis using example
cases in a numerical simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication allows us to solve tasks that are impossible to achieve using classical communication
alone. The most well known example of such a task is quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2], but many more
application protocols are already known (see e.g. [3]). Such application protocols run on the end nodes of a quantum
network. These may range from simple photonic devices capable of preparing and measuring qubits, to sophisticated
quantum processors. Recently, stages of development for a quantum internet were identified [3], where each stage is
distinguished by a specific functionality that is offered to a user wishing to execute quantum network applications.
Higher stages bring an increase of functionality – and thus a richer set of possible application protocols – at the
expense of increased experimental difficulty.
Given such stages of development, one can ask whether there exists an efficient test to certify that a network offers
the capabilities of a specific stage, and with what quality parameters. Here, we will examine this question with a
focus on a specific set of protocols in the stage called a quantum memory network. Specifically, a network is called a
quantum memory network supporting k-rounds protocols on Q qubits, if for any two nodes A, and B, the following
functionality is available: First, the network allows the deterministic or heralded generation of a maximally entangled
state |ΨAB〉. The term heralded thereby refers to entanglement generation that is deterministic conditioned on a
heralding signal, that indicates entanglement production. Second, node A can prepare at least any single-qubit state
|ψ〉, as well as Q− 1 qubits as an ancilla. Third, nodes A and B can perform measurements on any subsets of their
qubits, as well as have arbitrary unitary control. The term quantum memory network stems from the last feat, namely
that both nodes are capable of storing their qubits for a minimum time k · (`z + τ) where τ is the time that is required
to generate one maximally entangled state and send a classical message from node A to B maximized over all pairs
of nodes, and `z is the time that it takes for the execution of a depth z quantum circuit. Note that this stage enables
deterministic quantum teleportation, and thus also explicitly implies the ability to transmit qubits deterministically.
Many existing tests are known that can be used to estimate whether the operations above can each be performed
individually with high accuracy. Examples include quantum state [4] and process tomography [5], gate set tomogra-
phy [6, 7], randomized benchmarking [8–10] or capacity estimation to verify the quality of qubit transmission [11]. The
concept of self-testing even allows such estimates to be made with only partial trust in the devices used [12]. Having
estimated the quality of each individual operation with metrics such as the diamond distance, it is straightforward
to derive an overall estimate on how well protocols in this stage may be executed [3]. Yet, running many individual
tests is rather inefficient, and one may wonder whether there might exist an integrated test that instills confidence
that we are capable of performing protocols up to a certain number of rounds using the quantum memory network.
Another approach to testing quantum devices comes from the literature of (interactive) proof systems where a
verifier interacts with one or more provers who are trying to convince the verifier that a certain assertion is true, or
indeed that they possess certain capabilities. A well known example of such work is the question whether a classical
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2polynomially bounded verifier can convince herself that a prover holding a quantum computer does indeed have full
quantum computing capabilities, which has very recently been answered positively under some complexity theoretic
assumptions [13]. This line of research is not concerned with the quality of specific operations, but rather aims to
obtain a certificate of the provers’ general abilities to solve certain tasks. Such tests are appealing as they measure
general aptitude - for example in the domain of quantum computation the ability to execute quantum algorithms -
but do not typically make specific statements such as the actual number of physical qubits involved. Consequently,
such tests usually require large amount of resources to be executed.
II. RESULTS
Here we take a first step towards finding effective tests to certify that a network has the ability to perform a subset
of protocols within a certain stage of development. We propose a test which can be interpreted from two different
angles. First, we interpret it as a prover-verifier type protocol inspired by interactive proof literature, to certify that
the network has certain capabilities. Second, we interpret it as a tomography-type protocol where we estimate certain
properties of operations.
• Ping-pong test. We formulate our test in a bipartite scenario where nodes A and B exchange quantum
registers according to a defined set of rules. We call our test the ping-pong game as it is executed by passing
qubits back and forth between two nodes. Additionally, the nodes apply gates specified by a gate set G. An
important parameter of our test is the number of times k that the nodes pass (ping-pong) the state around.
• Prover-verifier view. Our protocol can be viewed as a simple game that the provers (the nodes) play against
the verifier with the objective of convincing the verifier that they are capable of executing any protocol in the
quantum memory stage, which has a specific form. In particular, we show that the provers win the k-round
ping-pong game with probability one if and only if they are capable of executing perfectly any protocol of the
following form: for any possible starting state |ψ〉, each node is capable of executing one possible gate G ∈ G,
before sending the resulting state to the other node. The nodes continue in this form for k rounds, before
measuring at the end. Moreover, in the case when the winning probability is strictly less than one, we certify
that the nodes sent information about the state at least a certain number m < k of times.
• Estimation view. In the estimation view we take on a different perspective with the objective to estimate
the quality of the operations performed by the nodes, as opposed to certifying their capabilities. We use the
statistics of the ping-pong test to assess a measure of the overall quality of the network. We then compare this
to the quality one would expect from combining the estimates of the individual devices used in the network.
What is more, we estimate the performance of k-round protocols based on our ping-pong test. In order to
evaluate the accuracy of our analytical results, we compare our analytical estimate with numerical estimates for
a specific example of a k-round protocol influenced by noise.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. III we define the k-round protocols and introduce our test. Then, inspired
by the interactive proof literature, in Sec. IV we view our test in the prover-verifier setting. In Sec. V we view our
test in the context of estimation.
III. PING-PONG TEST
A. k-round protocols
We start with formally describing k-round protocols. For the sake of clarity, throughout the rest of the manuscript
we will assume that protocols run on a single qubit. We remark that the results we present generalize for any number
Q of qubits (for details see App. G).
A bipartite k-round protocol between any two nodes A and B consists of the following consecutive operations:
1. Local preparation Prep of a perfect qubit state |ψ〉 by node A.
2. Sending deterministically the local qubit from node A to node B and vice versa, using a quantum channel EA→B .
Sending time is upper-bounded by tsend = L/vtr, where L is the distance between nodes A and B, and vtr is a
known transmission speed.
33. Storing the local qubit by nodes A or B, denoted by MA and MB respectively. Storage of the qubit takes time
tM .
4. Applying an arbitrary local operation by a node on the local qubit. We describe this operation by a gate GA ∈ G
and GB ∈ G, where G is an arbitrary set of gates, for example the single-qubit Clifford gates. Executing a circuit
of depth z takes time `z.
5. Perfect local measurement of the local qubit at the end of the protocol. The measurements are specified by
operators ΠA and ΠB for nodes A and B respectively.
Steps 2. – 4. are performed in rounds j = 1, ..., k a total number of k times. We call k the depth of the protocol.
Each round takes time ∆t = tsend + tM + `z, so that tj+1 − tj = ∆t, for all j. Without loss of generality we assume
here that the protocols always start at node A. Note that the parity of j indicates at which node the single qubit is
located, i.e., for odd j the qubit is held (sent) by A and for even j – by B. Therefore, we denote the local operations
performed by A or B at a j-th round by simply putting Mj , Gj . In particular, in this notation Ej means that a qubit
is sent by A and received by B for odd j (Ej ≡ EAj→Bj ), and vice-versa for even j.
Definition 1 (k-round protocols). We define a k-round protocol as a map of the form Π ◦ Pk ◦Prep , where:
• Prep is a preparation of a local qubit |ψ〉 (Step 1).
• Pk is a map describing k rounds of local operations – memories Mj and gates Gj , as well as sending a qubit
between A and B (Steps 2 – 4),
Pk =©kj=1 Gj ◦Mj ◦ Ej . (1)
• Π is a local measurement of all the local qubits (Step 5). Note that depending on the parity of k the measurement
is performed either on A’s or B’s side.
B. Test
In this section we describe our ping-pong test. The test is a simple instance of a k-round protocol as in Def. 1.
As we will see in next sections, passing the test will allow us to draw conclusion about the whole class of k-round
protocols.
Since our test will be later on viewed from two different angles, we introduce a node V which will interact with the
nodes A and B. In the prover-verifier view, Sec. IV, the node V will act as a verifier. Whereas, in the estimation
view, Sec. V, the nodes A and B can take up the role of V . We choose the testing nodes A and B to be farthest apart
in the network to maximize the communication time between them.
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FIG. 1: A schematic illustrating a single execution of depth κ = 2 of the ping-pong test, Test 1.
41. General ping-pong test
In our test, the task of the nodes is to send (“ping-pong”) an unknown state an unknown number of times and at
every ping-pong round apply a quantum operation given by V , see Fig. 1. Additionally, at every round V gives the
nodes a challenge – either to output the quantum state or continue the ping-pong. At the end of each execution of the
test, i = 1, . . . , n, the nodes output a state. V measures this output and produces a single classical bit vi: 1 means
“accept” and 0 means “reject”, see Test 1. We assume that the nodes’ operations are independent and identical across
executions i of the test. This implies that vi are independent and identically distributed (IID) random variables. We
define a winning rate in such a game as the ratio of wins to the total number of executions:
R =
1
n
n∑
i=1
vi. (2)
Test 1 General ping-pong test (k,G,X )
Fix maximum depth k, gate set G and set of states X . Fix a total number of executions n.
1: for i = 1, . . . , n do
2: V chooses depth κ uniformly at random and constructs a challenge string ~fκ = 1 . . . 110 of length κ
3: V samples independently κ gates from the set G and creates a sequence ~gκ = G1 . . . Gκ
4: V samples a state |ψ〉 ∈ X and distributes it to A . t1 = 0
5: for j = 1, ..., κ do
6: if j odd then
7: A sends |ψ〉 to B using Ej . tj
8: B stores the received state in memory Mj . tj + tsend
9: V gives a classical description of Gj to B . tj + tsend + tM
10: B applies Gj to the state in the memory
11: V distributes a challenge bit fj ∈ {0, 1} to B according to the string ~fκ . tj + tsend + tM + `
12: if fj = 1 then
13: j = j + 1
14: continue
15: else
16: B outputs his state
17: V measures {Π3κ =©κj=1Gj(|ψ〉〈ψ|),Π7κ = 1−©κj=1Gj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)}
18: V decides on the value vi (’0’ accept, ’1’ reject)
19: break
20: else if j even then
21: B sends |ψ〉 to A using Ej . tj
22: A stores the received state in memory Mj . tj + tsend
23: V gives a classical description of Gj to A . tj + tsend + tM
24: A applies Gj to the state in the memory
25: V distributes a challenge bit fj ∈ {0, 1} to A according to the string ~fκ . tj + tsend + tM + `
26: if fj = 1 then
27: j = j + 1
28: continue
29: else
30: A outputs her state
31: V measures {Π3κ =©κj=1Gj(|ψ〉〈ψ|),Π7κ = 1−©κj=1Gj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)}
32: V decides on the value vi (’0’ accept, ’1’ reject)
33: break
5The ping-pong test of depth κ for a sequence of chosen gates ~gκ = G1, . . . , Gκ can be associated with the following
operator
Sκ =©κj=1 Gj ◦Mj ◦ Ej . (3)
In a single execution of Test 1, the test can succeed with a certain probability. For all executions i, we define such
probability, conditioned on a specific input state |ψ〉, a fixed depth κ and a fixed sequence of gates ~gκ as
p3|ψ,~gκ,κ = Tr
[Sκ(|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Π3κ] (4)
and similarly the probability of failure, p7|ψ,~gκ,κ = Tr
[Sκ(|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Π7κ]. Note that p3|ψ,~gκ,κ does not depend on the
execution i, since we assume that executions are IID. Here {Π3κ ,Π7κ} denotes the measurement performed by V at the
end of each execution i. We fix the figure of merit to be the average probability P3 that the nodes succeed (vi = 1)
in the test.
Definition 2 (average probability of success for Test 1). The probability of success in the teleportation-based ping-
pong test, Test 2, averaged over depths κ, strings of gates ~gκ of length κ, and states |ψ〉 ∈ X is defined as
P3 =
1
n
∑
i
1
k
∑
κ
1
|X |
∑
ψ
1
|G|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~gκ,κ
=
1
k
∑
κ
1
|X |
∑
ψ
1
|G|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~gκ,κ,
(5)
where the last equality holds due to the IID assumption. Here k is the maximum depth of the test, X is the chosen
set of states and G is the chosen set of gates.
2. Teleportation-based ping-pong test
In the case when X is the set of all single-qubit states, the average probability of success gives us an estimate on
the average fidelity of the test, see Sec. V. This would require sampling from X according to the Haar measure in
the test. However, the same can be achieved more efficiently, by using sampling from the finite set of the six Pauli
states X. The reason for this is that X has a property of a 2-design, meaning that discrete uniform averaging over
states in X reproduces the Haar average over the full state space. A similar observation holds for Haar sampling from
a set of gates G in the case when G is a full unitary group. Then, it is enough to consider sampling from the Clifford
group of single-qubit gates Cliff to reproduce the average probability of success. Note that this allows us to estimate
the average fidelity of the test, even in the case when one is not able to implement the full unitary group. For more
details on 2-design properties of the above sets see App. D.
Therefore, we consider a more efficient version of the ping-pong test, Test 2. Motivated by the above and the fact
that for a quantum network quantum channels between the nodes are realized by quantum teleportation, we choose:
1. the set of states is the set of six Pauli eigenstates, |ψ〉 ∈ X with a uniform probability distribution 1|X| = 16 ;
2. the set of gates is the Clifford set for a single qubit, Cj ∈ Cliff with a uniform probability distribution 1|Cliff| ;
3. sending a qubit from node A to B is done with perfect deterministic teleportation.
We describe the teleportation-based ping-pong test with a triple (k,Cliff,X). Note that in this case the quantum
channel at round j, Ej , is equivalent to applying a quantum memory MTj to a half of the Bell pair by one of the
provers. We can put τ = tM + tsend, which is the time required to generate one maximally entangled state and send
over a classical message from node A to B. Hence, a teleportation-based ping-pong test of depth κ for a sequence of
chosen Clifford gates ~cκ = C1, . . . , Cκ can be associated with the following operator
Tκ =©κj=1 Cj ◦MTj . (6)
For detailed mathematical description of the test, we refer the reader to App. B.
6Test 2 Teleportation-based ping-pong test (k,Cliff,X)
Fix maximum depth k, fix the gate set to Clifford set Cliff and the set of states to the set of six Pauli states X. Fix
the total number of executions n.
1: for i = 1, . . . , n do
2: V chooses depth κ and constructs a challenge string ~fκ = 1 . . . 110 of length κ
3: V samples independently and uniformly at random κ gates from the set Cliff and creates a sequence ~cκ =
C1 . . . Cκ
4: V samples independently and uniformly at random a state |ψ〉 ∈ X and distributes it to A . t1 = 0
5: for j = 1, ..., κ do
6: if j odd then
7: A sends |ψ〉 to B using deterministic teleportation . tj
8: B stores half of his teleportation Bell pair in memory MTj for time τ
9: V gives a classical description of Cj to B . tj + τ
10: B applies Cj to the state in the memory
11: V distributes a challenge bit fj ∈ {0, 1} to B according to the string ~fκ . tj + τ + `
12: if fj = 1 then
13: Set B = A and A = B
14: continue
15: else
16: B outputs his state
17: V measures {Π3κ =©κj=1Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|),Π7κ = 1−©κj=1Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)}
18: V decides on the value vi (’0’ reject, ’1’ accept)
19: break
20: else if j even then
21: B sends |ψ〉 to A using deterministic teleportation . tj
22: A stores half of her teleportation Bell pair in memory MTj for time τ
23: V gives a classical description of Cj to A . tj + τ
24: A applies Cj to the state in the memory
25: V distributes a challenge bit fj ∈ {0, 1} to A according to the string ~fκ . tj + τ + `
26: if fj = 1 then
27: continue
28: else
29: A outputs her state
30: V measures {Π3κ =©κj=1Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|),Π7κ = 1−©κj=1Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)}
31: V decides on the value vi (’0’ reject, ’1’ accept)
32: break
By using Def. 2 with the set of Pauli states X and the set of Clifford gates Cliff, the average probability of success
for the teleportation-based ping-pong, Test 2, is
P3 =
1
k
∑
κ
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ. (7)
Note that in Test 2 the sampling of depths, gates and states is done uniformly at random. Using the definition of
the expected value and the IID assumption (∀i, j E[vi] = E[vj ]), we can write that the winning rate has the expected
value E[R] = 1k
∑
κ
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ · 1 + p7|ψ,~cκ,κ · 0.
Lemma 1. The expected value of the winning rate R in Test 2, Eq. (2), is equal to the average probability of success
P3,
E[R] = P3. (8)
7Corollary 1 (finite statistics). The probability that the winning rate R differs from the average probability of success
P3 by more than  is exponentially small in ,
Pr [|R− P3| ≤ ] ≥ 1− 2e−2n2 . (9)
Furthermore, let us set δ = 2e−2n
2
. If one fixes confidence δ and accuracy , then the minimum number of rounds n
necessary to attain these parameters is given by n ≥ ln(2δ
−1)
22 .
IV. PROVER-VERIFIER VIEW
In this section we interpret our test, Test 2 in the prover-verifier view. Specifically, we view our test as an interactive
game played between a verifier V (trusted third party), and two provers (the nodes A and B) [14]. An interactive game
is a situation where provers exchange a fixed-sized quantum register with the verifier n times. The verifier is honest
and wants to verify a certain statement, operating according to a defined set of rules. However, potentially dishonest
provers optimize towards a strategy that causes a verifier to output 1 (accept). We further assume assume a standard
scenario, where the provers agree on their strategy prior to the beginning of the test and they do not communicate
to readjust it during the execution, see Def. 4. In contrast to the interactive proof literature, in our framework we
consider finitely many test executions and therefore, we can also make non-asymptotic statistical statements.
In this view, performing Test 2 allows us to certify that the provers have capabilities to perform k-round protocols.
Indeed, if the provers follow the test then they can convince the verifier that they do so and achieve a high average
probability of success. On the other hand, if the provers do not follow the test they cannot achieve a high probability
of success and the verifier detects this behavior with high probability. Formally, we require that the test satisfies:
• completeness – if the provers are able to execute protocols that are certified by the test then they succeed in a
game against the verifier, i.e. achieve a winning rate above a certain winning threshold t, R > t, see Eq. (2);
• soundness – if the provers are not able to execute protocols certified by the test, then they can only achieve a
winning rate R ≤ t.
A. Sending channel
Let us now introduce a framework that formalizes what we mean by a round of a quantum communication. Whereas
numerous schemes to describe local operations exist [4–10] it is not clear how to certify a round of quantum commu-
nication. To achieve this, we will assume that the provers are not honest, and might therefore employ an arbitrary
strategy leading to a high probability of success. In particular, they might even try to not use a communication
channel at all in some rounds of the protocol. As a consequence, we have to specify what we mean by a round of
communication.
For sending classical bits one typically considers the following scenario: A chooses a random bit bA0 ∈R {0, 1} at
time t0 and wishes to send it to B. We then say that the nodes used a classical channel Ecl : A→ B if the probability
at time t1 that B’s bit is the same as A’s, is equal to 1, Pr[bB1 = bA0 ] = 1. In analogy, we could say that quantum
communication through a quantum channel E : A0 → B1 occurred if at time t0 a quantum state |ψ〉A0 was input on
node A and at time t1 it appeared on node B with probability 1, Pr[ρB1 = |ψ〉〈ψ|A0 ] = 1.
Note that in the classical case, we can prove that the channel was used to send information about the bit only for
one round, by giving a uniformly random bit to A and ask B to guess it. Indeed if B guesses it with probability
higher than 1/2 then some information must have traveled from A to B. Given a single bit as an input, one cannot
generalize that to many rounds with a “ping-pong” type of protocol like Test 2. This is due to the fact that before
A sends information to B in the first round, she can keep a copy of the bit. However, this issue can be avoided in
a quantum setting due to the no-cloning theorem [15]. Indeed, if A gets a random unknown state and B is able to
output the exact same state (with probability 1), then not only did all the (quantum) information about the state
traveled from A to B, but also A could not have kept any information about the state to herself (see Thm. 2).
While the above definition provides a good intuition of what is going on, it becomes impractical when states do
not have a unit probability of being transmitted through a channel (which in relation to our test means t < 1). In
such a scenario, classically, we can say that the nodes used a classical channel Ecl : A0 → B1 if the probability of
correctly identifying A’s input bit on B’s side increased in time, Pr[outB1 = bA0 ] > Pr[outB0 = bA0 ]. This implies
that some information about the bit must have been transferred from A to B, see Fig. 2. Our definition of quantum
communication is, therefore, a generalization of the above to the quantum case. We say that quantum communication
8E : A0 → B1 occurred if the probability of correctly outputting A’s input quantum state on B’s side increased in
time, see Def. 3.
Quantum sending channel
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FIG. 2: Informal representation of a sending channel in a classical and quantum case.
In words, we say that a sending channel was used by the nodes if the fidelity averaged over all states, and optimized
over all operations Γ that the nodes can locally do, increased from instant t0 to t1. Note that the above definition
implies that any communication, quantum or classical, which increases fidelity of the state is considered a sending
channel. As an example consider the following strategy. Node A receives an unknown state from the verifier, measures
it in the standard basis and sends the measurement outcome to B. Without loss of generality, let this measurement
outcome be 0. Before receiving A’s measurement outcome, B has average probability 12 of correctly passing verifier’s
test. However, after receiving A’s measurement outcome, B can locally prepare |0〉 state which increases the average
probability of correctly identifying verifier’s state to 23 . Therefore, there exists a purely classical strategy which satisfies
our definition. As a consequence, we say that whenever the nodes do not use a sending channel E , no communication
(quantum or classical) occurred between them.
Definition 3 (sending channel). A channel EA0→B1 is a sending channel if there exists a CPTP map ΩA0→A0B0 such
that ∀ |ψ〉A0 it creates a state ρ
ψ
A0B0
= Ω(|ψ〉〈ψ|A0) and
sup
ΓB0B1
∫
dψ Tr
[
ΓB0B1
(
ρψB0B1
)
· |ψ〉〈ψ|A0
]
> sup
ΓB0
∫
dψ Tr
[
ΓB0
(
ρψA0B0
)
· |ψ〉〈ψ|A0
]
, (10)
where ρψB0B1 = EA0→B1(ρ
ψ
A0B0
), Γ is a CPTP map which traces out additional registers of A and B and outputs a
qubit state. In particular, if
sup
ΓB0B1
∫
dψ Tr
[
ΓB0B1
(
ρψB0B1
)
· |ψ〉〈ψ|A0
]
= 1 and sup
ΓB0
∫
dψ Tr
[
ΓB0
(
ρψA0B0
)
· |ψ〉〈ψ|A0
]
=
1
2
(11)
then we talk about an exact sending channel.
Definition 4 (m-cheating). Provers A and B are m-cheating if their cheating strategy uses a sending channel E
between them at most m times. We assume that the provers choose a strategy – in which round they use a sending
channel and in which they do not – prior to the beginning of the test.
B. Exact completeness and soundness
To investigate the power of Test 2 in verifying capabilities of the network, we first consider an instructive case
when P3 = 1. If the nodes are able to perfectly execute the test then they succeed with a unit probability, trivially
satisfying the completeness, see Thm. 1. On the other hand, if we demand that the nodes always succeed in the
game, we can ask the question whether the nodes have the ability to perfectly execute protocols that have the form
of Test 2, i.e., whether the test is sound. We answer this question positively in Thm. 2 below.
Theorem 1 (exact completeness). If the provers are honest and they are able to perfectly execute Test 2 then they
succeed P3 = 1.
Theorem 2 (exact soundness). If the provers win the test with P3 = 1 then they must be able to perfectly execute
Test 2 and they use an exact sending channel E between them k times.
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FIG. 3: Winning threshold t vs the average fidelity of individual
operations µ¯. The plot shows the inverse of the function hk, i.e.
h−1k (t) for k = 6.
Idea of the proof. To prove the theorem, we argue that P3 = 1 implies that the probability of winning p3|ψ,~cκ,κ for all
states, all Clifford gates and all depths should be 1 (in particular, this implies that the provers are able to apply the
required Clifford gates on the input state). Therefore, the average fidelity at every depth κ should be 1. That is, if at
step κ− 1 A has fidelity 1 it means that the state on A is pure, and by a purifying argument, B’s average fidelity at
step κ− 1 must be 1/2. At step κ B has fidelity 1, which means that whatever channel A and B have used between
step κ− 1 and κ, it must be an exact sending channel (see Def. 3). For more details see App. E 1.
Note that in practice we are only able to observe the winning rate R and, due to the finite statistics of our test, we
cannot certify P3 = 1.
C. Completeness and soundness
Therefore, let us explore the implications of Test 2, given that the winning rate R > t is observed. If the provers are
honest and their devices are sufficiently good, their winning rate should be larger than threshold t with high probability.
More specifically, let memories and gates at every round j be described in terms of the average fidelity. Furthermore,
assume that the quality of memory and gates is the same at every round j, i.e. for all j, the average fidelity
µ¯ =
∫
dψTr
[
Cj ◦MTj (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
]
. Below we show that for honest provers, a certain fidelity of operations
implies a bound on the winning rate. Let hk(µ¯) =
µ¯(µ¯k−1)
k(µ¯−1) .
Theorem 3 (completeness). If provers are honest and their individual operations satisfy µ¯ ≥ h−1k (t) + , then the
winning rate R in Test 2 is bounded by R ≥ t with probability at least 1− e−n2 , where t is a winning threshold and 
is given by Eq. (9).
Idea of the proof. Using 2-design properties of the set of states X and the set of gates Cliff, we show that in the regime
where fidelity µ¯ is the same for every round j, we can express the average probability of success as a sum of powers
of µ¯. That is, P3 =
1
k
∑k
κ=1 µ¯
κ = µ¯(µ¯
k−1)
k(µ¯−1) = hk(µ¯), see App. E 2 for details. Since we want the winning rate R to be
higher than the threshold t, we invert the function hk to obtain a bound on the fidelity of the devices µ¯. We plot the
inverse h−1k (t) in Fig. 3.
Moreover, we can ask whether the converse of the above statement is true, i.e. whether a certain winning rate R > t
implies something about Test 2. When the provers are honest, we can reverse the completeness statement obtaining
a bound on the quality of their devices. If the provers are dishonest (m-cheating) then they do not have to exactly
follow the test. However, in this case we will show that the winning rate R allows us to certify that the provers used
a sending channel (Def. 3) a certain number of times.
Theorem 4 (soundness). If the provers are m-cheating then the winning rate in Test 2 is bounded by R ≤
1
k
(
m+ 56 (k −m)
)
+ , with probability at least 1 − e−n2 , where t is a winning threshold and  is given by Eq.
10
(9). Moreover, if the provers are honest, but all of their operations satisfy µ¯ ≤ h−1k (t)−  then R ≤ t with probability
at least 1− e−n2 .
Idea of the proof. In the case when the provers are honest, the soundness statement is simply the converse of the
completeness. In the case when the provers are m-cheating they agree on a cheating strategy, which uses a quantum
channel E between them at most m times, see Def. 4. To prove soundness in this case we look at the average
probability of winning for A and B at time steps κ − 1 and κ. In App. E 2 we argue that whenever the provers use
the channel E , this probability is bounded by 1. On the other hand, whenever they do not use the channel and no
communication occurred, we argue that the average probability of winning at both time steps is bounded by 56 which
is the bound provided by the approximate cloning theorem [16]. Since the nodes use the channel E at least m times,
their overall average probability of winning P3 is bounded by
1
k
(
m+ 56 (k −m)
)
.
The above theorem implies that in the situation when we do not trust the nodes, the higher m we would like to
certify, the higher the winning threshold should be. Indeed, for P3 ≥ t we obtain m ≥ k(6t − 5). If we now set
t = 1− η, for some small η, then m ≥ k − 6kη. For m ∼ k, one should set at least η = O(k−1).
Remark. Note that in Thm. 2 we are able to fully certify the action of the provers, even if they are not trusted.
In particular, we know that they have perfectly sent the state to each other k times. On the other hand, Thm. 4
only certifies the use of some quantum or classical channel regardless of its quality. In particular, in the limit where
P3 = 1, Thm. 4 show that m = k sending channels have been used, but we cannot explicitly certify the quality of the
channel. However, the exact soundness statement, Thm. 2, suggests that even in the imperfect case, the test should
be able to certify the quality of each individual operation used by the provers.
V. ESTIMATION VIEW
In this section we interpret our test in the context of estimation in order to obtain measures of confidence in the
nodes’ ability to perform the test. We assume that the nodes A and B are honest and follow the protocol. Specifically,
we use the winning rate R in the teleportation-based ping-pong test, as a figure of merit to estimate the quality of
the network. We then provide a consistency check which allows us to compare this to the quality one would expect
from combining the individual devices. Furthermore, we use the statistics of the test to estimate the performance of
k-round protocols.
Throughout this section we will use a tilde to denote noisy counterparts of operations, for example T˜κ will denote
a noisy realization of the κ-round teleportation-based ping-pong test Tκ, Test 2.
A. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce mathematical tools which will be useful for (i) checking whether the test is consistent
when the honest nodes use devices of a certain quality, Sec. V B, and (ii) drawing conclusions about the performance
of k-round protocols, Sec. V C and V D.
We describe the quality of individual devices with a noise model. Specifically, we assume that the individual
operations used in the test, i.e. memories Mj and gates Cj , have been tested individually for each round j, to obtain
an estimate on their performance. More formally, let the quality of a noisy gate C˜j at round j, be described with the
average fidelity, F¯ (C˜j) =
∫
dψTr
[
C˜j(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
]
, for all j = 1, . . . , k. Furthermore, let the average fidelity
have an empirical estimate rCj , which is known with certain precision [17], such that
Pr
[
|rCj − F¯ (C˜j)| ≤ Cj
]
≥ 1− δCj , (12)
where δCj = 2e
−2nCj 2Cj . Here nCj is the number of repetitions with which the estimate rCj was obtained. Similarly,
for M˜Tj a noisy quantum memory at round j, average fidelity is F¯ (M˜
T
j ) =
∫
dψTr
[
M˜Tj (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·MTj (|ψ〉〈ψ|)
]
. This
average fidelity has an empirical estimate rMTj and a precision bound
Pr
[
|rMTj − F¯ (M˜
T
j )| ≤ MTj
]
≥ 1− δMTj , (13)
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where δMTj = 2e
−2n
MT
j
2
MT
j . Furthermore, we assume that the nodes can locally and perfectly prepare and measure a
quantum state.
The teleportation-based ping-pong test, Test 2, is performed the total of n times. Note that one can easily record
which executions i were performed for depths κ, states ψ and strings of Clifford gates ~cκ. Then, in analogy to Eq.
(2), we can define the winning rate for a fixed depth κ and string ~cκ,
R~cκ,κ =
1
n~cκ,κ
∑
i
vi~cκ,κ, (14)
where n~cκ,κ is a total number of executions for fixed κ and ~cκ, and v
i
~cκ,κ
is a corresponding random variable assuming
values 0 and 1 for ’lose’ and ’win’ events respectively. Analogously, we can record which executions correspond to a
fixed depth κ only. We define
Rκ =
1
nκ
∑
i
viκ (15)
as the winning rate for a fixed κ. Here nκ is a total number of executions for depth κ and v
i
κ is a corresponding
random variable recording the wins in the test.
Now we will relate the above winning rates to the measures of quality of the test. Intuitively, the higher the winning
rate the better the test performs and the less noise is present in the setup. In the remaining part of this section we
make that statement rigorous.
Lemma 2. Let the average fidelity of a noisy realization of Test 2, T˜κ, for a fixed depth κ and a fixed string of Clifford
gates ~cκ be defined as F¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ) =
∫
dψTr
[
T˜κ(|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Π3κ
]
, where Tκ is defined as in Eq. 6. The expected value of
the winning rate R~cκ,κ over the set of states X, is equal to the average fidelity of the test T˜κ,
E [R~cκ,κ]X = F¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ). (16)
Idea of the proof. The first step of the proof is to notice that the expected value of the variable vi~cκ,κ is the probability
of success in a single round averaged over all the states in X,
E
[
vi~cκ,κ
]
X
=
1
|X|
∑
ψ∈X
(
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ · 1 + p7|ψ,~cκ,κ · 0
)
=
1
|X|
∑
ψ∈X
Tr
[
T˜κ(|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Π3κ
]
(17)
The second step is based on relating the above quantity to the average fidelity. Here the key idea is to observe that
the expression under the trace contains only polynomials of degree 2 in |ψ〉〈ψ|. Therefore one can use the 2-design
properties of the set X to equate the discrete averaging over the six Pauli states to the continuous Haar averaging
over the whole state space in average fidelity. The details of the proof can be found in App. F 1.
The above lemma has a simple useful corollary, namely, that the average fidelity and the winning rate R~cκ,κ can be
related through the Hoeffding inequality,
Pr
[
|R~cκ,κ − F¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ)| ≥ ~cκ,κ
]
≥ 1− 2e−2n~cκ,κ2~cκ,κ . (18)
Before we make a similar connection for the rate Rκ, let us define a useful quantity.
Definition 5 (double-averaged fidelity). Let F¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ) be the average fidelity of a the teleportation-based ping-pong
test, Test 2, defined for a fixed depth κ and a fixed sting of Clifford gates ~cκ. We define the quantity
F¯κ(T˜κ) :=
∫
dC1...
∫
dCκF¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ). (19)
as double-averaged fidelity. The averaging for every gate Cj is taken according to the Haar measure.
Lemma 3. The expected value of the winning rate Rκ in Test 2, for a fixed depth κ, taken over the set of states X
and set of Clifford gates, is equal to the double-averaged fidelity of the test T˜κ,
E [Rκ]X,Cliff = F¯κ(T˜κ). (20)
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The intuition behind the above lemma is that discrete averaging in E [Rκ]X,Cliff over the Clifford gates is equal to
the continuous averaging in the definition of F¯κ(T˜κ). This statement follows from the unitary 2-design properties of
the Clifford set, see App. F 2 for details.
Finally, the probability that the empirical data Rκ differs from double-averaged fidelity by more than κ is bounded
by the Hoeffding inequality,
Pr
[
|Rκ − F¯κ(T˜κ)| ≤ κ
]
≥ 1− 2e−2nκ2κ . (21)
B. Consistency check
In the following we demonstrate how to use the winning rates defined above to certify that devices of certain quality
were used in Test 2. We provide a bound which allows us to compare the quality of the test in terms of R~cκ,κ with
what one may expect given individual devices with estimates of average fidelities. Note that the bound we use in
Thm. 5 was derived in [18].
Theorem 5 (consistency check). Let rMTj and rCj , j = 1, . . . , k, be empirical estimates of the average fidelity of all
individual memories and gates respectively. Moreover let R~cκ,κ be an empirical estimate of the average fidelity of the
teleportation-based ping-pong test, Test 2, for a fixed depth κ and a fixed string of Clifford gates ~cκ. Devices with
estimates rMTj and rCj were used together in the test T˜κ if the following inequality is satisfied [18],
R~cκ,κ ≥
2 cos2
(∑κ
j=1 acos
√
3r
MT
j
−1
2 + acos
√
3rCj−1
2
)
+ 1
3
− ~cκ,κ (22)
The bound holds for any 2κ quantum channels such that
∑κ
j=1 acos
√
3r
MT
j
−1
2 + acos
√
3rCj−1
2 ≤ pi2 , and ~cκ,κ is given
by Eq. (18).
Recall that the individual estimates are known with certain confidence. That means that the above consistency
check will be satisfied with a certain probability. We state it formally in the corollary below.
Corollary 2. Given the estimates of average fidelities for memories rMTj and gates rCj are known with confi-
dence MTj and Cj respectively, the bound from Thm. 5 is satisfied by noisy devices with probability at least
1− 2∑κj=1(e−2nCj 2Cj + e−2nMTj 2MTj ).
Idea of the proof. The probability that the bound (22) is satisfied is equal to the unity, minus the probability that at
least one of the bounds for individual devices is not satisfied. By properties of probability one arrives at the statement
above, see App. F 3 for details.
C. Performance of k-round protocols
In this section we investigate the implications of Test 2 for the performance of more general k-round protocols
P˜k, see Def. 1. We show that their performance can be bounded using the winning rate Rκ (Sec. V A) in the
teleportation-based ping-pong test.
To explore the performance of protocols P˜k we consider the diamond distance [19], ‖ Π◦P˜k ◦Prep−Π◦Pk ◦Prep ‖.
However, since Prep and Π are perfect by assumption, the above diamond distance is upper-bounded by ‖ P˜k−Pk ‖,
which we fix to be the figure of merit in this section. It can be shown that the diamond distance is related to the
average fidelity in the following way [20],
‖ P˜k − Pk ‖≤ 2
√
6
√(
1− F¯k,~gk(P˜k)
)
, (23)
where F¯k,~gk(P˜k) =
∫
dψTr
[
P˜k(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · Pk(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
]
is the average fidelity of a protocol P˜k of a fixed depth k and
for a fixed string of gates ~gk. Note that the average fidelity differs depending on the sequence of gates one chooses
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to apply. Therefore, to estimate the behavior of protocol P˜k one would have to know fidelities F¯k,~gk(P˜k) for all
possible gate sequences G1, ..., Gk, which is unfeasible in practice. For this reason, it is much more convenient to use
double-averaged fidelity to bound the performance of a protocol P˜k. We formalize this argument in the following
theorem.
Theorem 6 (Performance of k-round protocols). The performance of single-qubit k-round protocols, Def. 1, can be
bounded in terms of an estimate for the double-averaged fidelity Rk of the k-round teleportation-based ping-pong test,
Test 2, in the following way
‖ P˜k − Pk ‖≤ 2
√
6
√
|Cliff|k (1−Rk + k) (24)
where |Cliff| is the size of the Clifford group for dimension 2 and k is given by Eq. (21). The bound is satisfied with
probability 1− e−2nκ2κ .
Idea of the proof. To prove the theorem, one first needs to observe that the double-averaged fidelity, F¯ (P˜k), can be
lower-bounded by F¯~gk(P˜k) minimized over all possible strings of gates ~gκ, see App. F for details.
Moreover we have that F¯k(P˜k) = F¯κ=k(T˜ κ=k). It follows from the fact that averaging over the Clifford group is
equivalent to averaging over the entire unitary group, since the Clifford group forms a 2-design. Furthermore, the
equality is possible, since we have put MTj ≡Mj ◦Ej , and MTj encompasses operations associated with sending (in the
test – teleporting) and storing the qubit. Combining the above with Eqs. (20) and (23) yields the desired result.
Finally, observe the above results can be straightforwardly generalized to bound the performance of protocols P˜K
for depth K > k. Since the teleportation-based ping-pong test is performed for all 1 ≤ κ ≤ k, we can define a set S
such that
∑
κ∈S κ = K. Then P˜K =©κ∈S P˜κ. Using the triangle inequality for the diamond distance, Thm. 6 can
be, therefore, rewritten as
‖ P˜K − PK ‖≤ 2
√
6
∑
κ∈S
√
|Cliff|κ (1−Rκ + κ), (25)
where κ is given by Eq. (21).
D. Simulated results
To gain intuition on how the test performs in this section we consider a few numerical examples. First, we discuss
the implications of the consistency check, Thm. 5 and articulate the relation between the average fidelity of individual
devices and the maximal depth of the test k. Second, we discuss the performance of the test under common noise
models, depolarizing and dephasing noise. Finally, we comment on bounding the noisy protocols P˜k based on numerical
results from the teleportation-based ping-pong test.
Assume a test of maximum depth k = 2, where we teleport a single qubit state at most two times between A and
B. Moreover, for simplicity say that A and B have access to memories and gates of equal fidelities, rMTj = rCj = r.
Recall, however, that the consistency check bound, Thm. 5, holds if 2k acos
(√
(3r − 1)/2
)
≤ pi/2 which for k = 2
implies that single fidelities should have values of at least 0.9023. What is more, observe that the higher depth of the
test k, i.e. the more devices one is testing, the higher individual fidelities should be. This implies an intrinsic bound
on the depth of the test for a fixed fidelity. For example, for devices with fidelity 0.99 one can pass a test of depth
at most k = 6. Note that if one adapts a formalism where average fidelity is the main figure of merit then results
presented here cannot be further improved, since the bound (22) is shown to be tight [18].
Let us now look at two specific noise models. Namely, let us model memories and gates to be (i) single-qubit
depolarizing channels, i.e. D(ρ) = pρ + (1 − p)1/2 and (ii) single-qubit dephasing channels, i.e. F(ρ) = qρ + (1 −
q)(ZρZ†)/2, where Z is the Pauli Z gate. Again, in these two cases let us fix the average fidelity estimate of individual
devices r. Fig. 4 presents the simulated behavior of the test as a function of individual estimates r in the two cases.
Observe that the test performs according to intuitive expectations – if the noise is modeled as dephasing, the average
fidelity of the test is higher than in the case of depolarizing noise, since the dephasing channel subjects any input state
only to the Z component of the Pauli noise, whereas depolarizing channel to all X, Y and Z components. Therefore,
we expect “more” noise when the state is subjected to the depolarizing noise.
Although in our network model we assume that the state preparation is perfect, it is interesting to see the behavior
of the test once imperfect states are used. Fig. 4 shows a result of simulation of the test when the initial state is
submitted to a small dephasing noise, such that fidelity of the input state is 0.9. Note that if one has access to the
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FIG. 4: Average fidelity of the test as a function of the average fidelity of individual devices r, left plot for κ = 1, right plot for κ = 2.
Solid lines represent simulation of the test with the dephasing channel D, dashed lines the simulation of the test with the depolarizing
channel F , and dotted lines the value of the bound (22). No markers (blue color) correspond to the case where the input state is perfect,
whereas the triangle markers (red color) to the case where the input state is dephased to initial fidelity 0.9.
average fidelity estimate of the noisy channel acting on the initial state, then one can use it in the consistency check
(22), simply treating the noise of the state as an additional channel in the protocol.
Let us also comment on the bound from Thm. 6. Already for a single qubit one obtains a constant prefactor of
2
√
d(d+ 1) ≈ 4.9. In addition to that, bound (24) contains a factor associated with the size of the Clifford group –
for a single qubit |Cliff| = 24. If one considers protocols of maximum depth k = 2 then to obtain a non-trivial bound
on the behavior of protocols in the class, the estimate of double-averaged fidelity must be of order Rκ = 1 − 10−5.
This puts a very high precision requirement on double-averaged fidelity and, consequently, on individual devices.
As an example consider a quantum gambling (QG) protocol [21]. In the protocol, A chooses one of the states
{|0z〉 , |0x〉} and sends it to B. After receiving the state B stores the state and communicates classically his guess on
the state sent by A. A upon receiving the classical message from B, communicates back whether B won or lost. After
this round of communication B measures the state either in Z basis or X basis. Let the protocol be described with
a map PQG which consists of local operations on the state (except measurement and state preparation, as before).
Then PQG consists of k = 2 rounds of communication during which B has to store the state. Assume that in the
protocol quantum memory is modeled as a depolarizing channel with fidelity 1− 105. Then explicit evaluation of the
diamond distance ‖ P˜QG−PQG ‖ yields value 6 · 10−5. On the other hand if one uses a two-round test to bound the
behavior of the protocol, without explicit a priori knowledge about the noise model of the memories then the bound
from Thm. 6 has the value 0.7436. However, using the fact that no gates are applied in the protocol and that the
memory is modeled as a depolarizing channel one can decrease that value to 0.0310, i.e. by one order of magnitude.
E. More imperfections
In our network model we have assumed that sending qubits as well as preparing a Bell pair can be done perfectly. In
particular, this implies that in our test teleportation is carried out perfectly. However, the test can still be performed
without major changes if one wishes to take into account noisy teleportation.
We consider two main noise sources arising in teleportation – noise coming from performing imperfect Bell mea-
surement and recovery operation, and noise originating from creation of a Bell pair. In App. C 1 we show that in a
single round j of our test both of these noise types can be absorbed into the noise coming from the memory M˜Tj , for
all j. For the former noise source we assume a noise model where the imperfections follow the Bell measurement but
precede recovery operation. For the latter noise source, we assume that noise is local for each half of the Bell pair and
that it can be modeled as mixed-unitary noise. That is, each half of the Bell pair is subjected to N(·) = ∑l plU†l (·)Ul,
where Ul is a unitary operation, and pl is a probability. Then all the teleportation noise can be included in the noise
of the memory and we can carry out the test as described above, i.e. by sending qubits via perfect teleportation.
Finally, we remark that our test can be extended onto multi-qubit settings, where the number of qubits in the
k-round protocol is Q. For a detailed description we refer the reader to App. G.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
In this work we considered the problem of certifying that a quantum network achieves the ability to perform a
subset of protocols within a certain stage of development, i.e. a stage called quantum memory network. We designed
the first testing protocol, which certifies that nodes have the capability to control and send qubits around the network
k times. We provided completeness and soundness statements for our protocol and expressed them in the interactive
proof language. Moreover, in an honest implementation, we demonstrated that passing our test allows us to estimate
statistical quantities about the devices used in the test and conclude about the performance of other k-round protocols
in a quantum network.
An important question is how our estimate of performance for the class of multi-round protocols can be improved.
Note that in our simple analysis we bound a very general class of protocols using a single test – we bound the behavior
of any unitary gate in terms of behavior of a small subset of gates. Therefore, it is not surprising that there must exist
a trade-off between universality of the protocols and the precision of estimating their performance. One improvement
could result from designing tests for a more specific (and therefore smaller) class of protocols. Alternatively, tailoring
tests using additional knowledge of the underlying noise in a quantum network could improve the bound on the
performance of k-round protocols.
Furthermore, as mentioned before, our test does not certify that any universal gate can be implemented. Due to
the mathematical structures of unitary designs that we used, we can only make a statement about implementability
of the gates from the Clifford set. It is, therefore, an open problem how to test a quantum memory in the presence
of the set powerful enough to generate any unitary operation. Such a universal set is, for example, a Clifford set
extended with a T gate [22, 23].
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In the following we present technical details of our work. We first provide mathematical preliminaries necessary for
our further considerations in App. A. Then, in App. B we give a detailed mathematical description of the general ping-
pong test, Test 1, and the teleportation-based ping-pong test, Test 2. In App. C we justify why in the teleportation-
based ping-pong test, it is possible to absorb the (possibly noisy) teleportation channel into a memory MTj . Next, we
discuss 2-design properties of sets of Pauli states and Clifford gates in App. D. In App. E we prove completeness and
soundness statements of our Test 2. Then, in App. F we give proofs of statements discussed in the estimation view
of our test. Finally, we discuss how to extend our results to Q-qubit protocols in App. G.
Appendix A: Preliminaries
Communication between nodes of a quantum network can be described by quantum channels. A quantum channel
can be described by a completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) linear map Λ : D(H) → D(H), where D(H)
denotes the space of density operators acting on Hilbert space H. In a realistic setup, quantum channels are not
perfect (or ideal) and instead of applying a perfect channel Λ one applies its noisy counterpart Λ˜. If the perfect Λ
is unitary, then without loss of generality, a noisy channel Λ˜ can be written as a noise map N followed by a perfect
channel Λ, i.e. Λ˜ = Λ ◦N . A sequence of n operations can be represented as a composition of n maps, Λ˜n ◦ ... ◦ Λ˜1.
One can quantify the difference between a noisy channel and its perfect implementation using the average fidelity.
Definition 6 (Average fidelity). The average fidelity of the channel Λ˜ (to Λ) is defined as
F¯ (Λ˜) =
∫
dψTr
[
Λ˜(|ψ〉〈ψ|) Λ(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
]
, (A1)
where dψ is the Haar measure on pure states.
Average fidelity is a quantity which can be accessed empirically and as such it is widely used as a parameter
estimating the quality of a quantum channel. One cannot hope, however, to empirically average over the continuum
of all pure states. Realistically, to access average fidelity one can use the properties of so called quantum state designs.
Intuitively, a quantum design is a probability distribution over pure states, which replicates the properties of the Haar
averaging over the entire space of pure states.
Definition 7 (Projective t-design). A projective t-design is a distribution {qψ, ψ} over some finite set of states such
that ∑
ψ
qψ |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗t =
∫
dψ |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗t . (A2)
An example of a projective 2-design for qubits is given by a set of six Pauli eigenstates, X chosen with equal
probability 16 . A similar definition can be used when talking about averaging over the unitary group U(d) of dimension
d, see [24] for details.
Definition 8 (Unitary 2-design). A set U(d) of unitary matrices is 2-design if for any quantum channel Λ holds that
[25]
1
|Y|
∑
Ul∈Y
U†l Λ(UlρU
†
l )Ul =
∫
dU U†Λ(UρU†)U (A3)
where dU denotes the Haar measure on U(d). An example of a 2-design for a unitary group U(d) is the Clifford group
Cliff(d) with uniform probability of each element.
Another useful figure of merit for channels is the diamond distance [19].
Definition 9 (Diamond distance). The diamond distance between two operators, Λ˜ and Λ, is defined through a
distance measure on the space of density operators, maximized over all density operators ρ,
‖ Λ˜− Λ ‖= sup
ρ
‖ Λ˜⊗ 1(ρ)− Λ⊗ 1(ρ) ‖1, (A4)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the trace distance. The operational meaning behind the diamond distance definition is that it
quantifies the worst-case distinguishability of any two quantum channels when one is given access to entanglement
with an auxiliary system.
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From the properties of the diamond distance it follows that,
‖ Λ˜N ◦ ... ◦ Λ˜1 − ΛN ◦ ... ◦ Λ1 ‖≤
N∑
j=1
‖ Λ˜j − Λj ‖ . (A5)
Note that such a relation cannot be easily found for average fidelity, since, unlike the diamond distance, fidelity is not
a metric.
Although the diamond distance offers a convenient theoretical description, it is not as practical as average fidelity.
But, since average fidelity and diamond distance both estimate the quality of a quantum channel, there exists a
relation between the two. Indeed, it can be shown CIT that
‖ Λ˜− Λ ‖≤ 2
√
d(d+ 1)
√
1− F¯ (Λ˜), (A6)
where d is the dimension of the underlying quantum system.
While performing an experiment, for example estimating the average fidelity, one gathers empirical data. To
compare the data with theoretical expectation one can use the Hoeffding’s inequality [17]. It states that the probability
of the empirical mean and its expectation differing by more than  is exponentially small in n.
Lemma 4 (Hoeffding’s inequality). If v1, ..., vn are independent random variables, 0 ≤ vi ≤ 1, with empirical mean
defined as
R =
v
n
=
∑n
i=1 vi
n
, (A7)
then an upper bound on the probability that the mean of random variables deviates from its expected value is given by
Pr[|R− E[R]| ≥ ] ≤ 2e−2n2 . (A8)
Lemma 5 (Choi isomorphism). For a map Ω : HS1 → HS2 the following identity holds:
Tr
[|ψ〉〈ψ|S2 ΩS1→S2(|ψ〉〈ψ|S1)] = (A9)
= |S1|Tr
[
|ψ〉〈ψ|S2 ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|S′1 ω
Γ
S2S′1
]
, (A10)
where ωΓS2S′1
is a Choi state associated with the map ΩS1→S2 of the form ω
Γ
S2S′1
= ΩS1→S2 ⊗ 1S′1(Φ), with Φ =∑
i,j |ii〉〈jj| /|S′1| being the maximally entangled state. Γ denotes partial transposition of ω on the system S′1, and |S1|
(|S′1|) is a size of Hilbert space HS1 (HS′1).
Appendix B: The test – detailed description
In this section we provide a mathematical detailed description of our tests. First we consider a general case of the
ping-pong test, Test 1. Then we discuss the specific case of the teleportation-based ping-pong test, Test 2.
1. General ping-pong test
We describe a general test Test 1 as a CPTP map which we will denote Sκ. We first consider all the registers available
to the nodes. We call κ the depth of the test and assume that κ is a natural number upper-bounded by given k. The
time for performing one round j = 1, ..., κ of the protocol is equal for all the rounds, i.e. ∆t = tj+1−tj = tsend +tM +`.
We will describe a round where node A initiates sending of the state, which implies that j is odd. However, this
description is fully symmetric and for even j it is enough to interchange registers of A with registers of B. A sends
the qubit |ψ〉〈ψ|Ainj to node B using channel EAinj →Bj which takes time upper-bounded by tsend. After time tsend + tM
the verifier chooses a gate according to distribution pG and gives its classical description |gj〉〈gj |Gj to B. B applies
the quantum gate that corresponds to the description and that we describe with a CPTP map GGjBj→Gj . This takes
time `. After this, at time tsend + tM + ` the verifier distributes a challenge bit |fj〉〈fj |Fj chosen uniformly at random
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(0 means ’teleport back’, 1 means ’output’). Depending on the challenge, B applies INFjBEPRj →Binj+1 for fj = 0 and
OUTFjBj→Boutj for fj = 1.
Definition 10. (Honest round j) Round j-th round of a general test, where provers are honest, can be described as
ΛˆAinj FjGj→Binj+1 = INFjBEPRj →Binj+1 ◦GGjBj→Bj ◦MBj→Bj ◦ EAinj →Bj (B1)
whenever the challenge bit is 0, or
ΛˆAinj FjGj→Boutj = OUTFjBj→Boutj ◦GGjBj→Bj ◦MBj→Bj ◦ EAinj →Bj (B2)
whenever the challenge bit is 1.
Note that challenge bits form a string of length κ, f1 . . . fκ, in registers F1 . . . Fκ, consisting of κ − 1 ones and a
single zero bit on κ-th position. We denote such a string by ~f , i.e. ~fκ = 1 . . . 10︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ
. For simplicity we will use a short
notation for multiple registers, e.g. F[1,κ] ≡ F1 . . . Fκ. Similarly, we will denote by ~gκ a sequence of κ gates chosen by
the verifier, each of the gates chosen at the time step defined above. By G[1,κ] ≡ G1 · · ·Gk we denote k registers for
the choice of a gate.
Definition 11. The ping-pong testing protocol of depth κ for a state |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ X , a sequence of gates ~gκ ∈ Gκ and a
string of challenges ~fκ = 1 . . . 10 is defined as a CPTP map Sκ such that
Sκ ≡ SAin1 F[1,κ]G[1,κ]→Boutκ
(
|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ⊗
∣∣∣~fκ〉〈~fκ∣∣∣
F[1,κ]
⊗ |~gκ〉〈~gκ|G[1,κ]
)
= (B3)
= ΛˆAinj FjGj→Boutj ◦©
κ−1
j=1 ΛˆAinj FjGj→Binj+1
(
|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ⊗
∣∣∣~fκ〉〈~fκ∣∣∣
F[1,κ]
⊗ |~gκ〉〈~gκ|G[1,κ]
)
(B4)
2. Teleportation-based test
We now describe a single round j of the test when the quantum communication is performed with teleportation,
Tκ (see Test 2). Let node A initiate the teleportation, i.e. j is odd. A round j starts with with placing the state to
be teleported |ψ〉〈ψ|Ainj in an input register of A, A
in
j . Nodes generate an EPR pair between each other, Φ
+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
.
A, using the generated pair, teleports the state |ψ〉〈ψ|Ainj to B by performing a Bell state measurement and sending
a classical message m ∈ M . This action is described by a CPTP map BAinj AEPRj →M . At the same time B applies
quantum memory to his half of the EPR pair while waiting for the classical message from A to arrive, which takes
time tM . We describe the action of the memory with a CPTP map MBEPRj →BEPRj . Upon receiving classical message
B now applies a recovery map RMBEPRj →BEPRj to recover the state which A teleported. Then, B applies a random
gate chosen by the verifier from the set of Clifford gates Cliff(2). This choice is announced by the verifier with a
classical register |cj〉〈cj |Cj . B then applies the gate to his recovered state, which we describe with a CPTP map
CCjBEPRj →BEPRj . This operation takes time `.
Now, at time tM + ` the verifier announces a flag in register Fj with the challenge bit, 0: teleport back, 1: output.
The choice of the challenge is uniform and random. Depending on the challenge, B applies INFjBEPRj →Binj+1 for fj = 0
and OUTFjBEPRj →Boutj for fj = 1. The whole round j takes time ∆t = tM + `.
Definition 12. (Round j of the teleportation-based test) We define a j-th round of teleportation as a sequence of
following maps
ΛAinj AEPRj BEPRj FjCj→Binj+1 = INFjBEPRj →Binj+1 ◦ CCjBEPRj →BEPRj ◦ RMBEPRj →BEPRj ◦MBEPRj →BEPRj ◦ BAinj AEPRj →M (B5)
whenever the challenge bit is 0, or
ΛAinj AEPRj BEPRj FjCj→Boutj = OUTFjBEPRj →Boutj ◦ CCjBEPRj →BEPRj ◦ RMBEPRj →BEPRj ◦MBEPRj →BEPRj ◦ BAinj AEPRj →M
(B6)
whenever the challenge bit is 1.
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Note that, for simplicity, in the main text we denote MTj = RMBEPRj →BEPRj ◦MBEPRj →BEPRj ◦ BAinj AEPRj →M .
Having defined a single round of a protocol we describe the ping-pong teleportation protocol of depth κ. Such a
protocol is simply a κ-round teleportation, where first κ− 1 maps have form (B5) and the last map outputs the state
and so has the form (B6).
Definition 13. The teleportation-based ping-pong testing protocol of depth κ for a state |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ X, a sequence of
gates ~cκ ∈ Cliffκ and a string of challenges ~fκ = 1 . . . 10 is defined as a CPTP map Tκ such that
Tκ ≡ TAin1 AEPR[1,κ]BEPR[1,κ]F[1,κ]C[1,κ]→Boutκ
|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ⊗ κ⊗
j=1
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
⊗
∣∣∣~fκ〉〈~fκ∣∣∣
F[1,κ]
⊗ |~cκ〉〈~cκ|C[1,κ]
 = (B7)
= ΛAinκ AEPRκ BEPRκ FκCκ→Boutκ ◦©κ−1j=1 ΛAinj AEPRj BEPRj FjCj→Binj+1
|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ⊗ κ⊗
j=1
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
⊗
∣∣∣~fκ〉〈~fκ∣∣∣
F[1,κ]
⊗ |~cκ〉〈~cκ|C[1,κ]
 ,
(B8)
where Λ’s are defined as in Def. 12.
3. Measurements
Upon receiving requested state from either A or B, V must check its consistency with the distributed state, as well
as confirm applying desired gates. This can be achieved by projecting outcomes onto the state Cκ◦· · ·◦C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Boutκ ,
which is the original state rotated with κ Clifford channels.
Definition 14 (POVM elements for the node V ). Measurements performed by V in the teleportation-based ping-pong
test can be described by POVM elements,
Πκ3 = Cκ ◦ · · · ◦ C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Boutκ (B9)
Πκ7 = 1− Cκ ◦ · · · ◦ C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Boutκ (B10)
for all κ = 1, . . . , k. κ denotes here the output register of the κ-th party, depending on the parity either A or B.
4. Renaming teleportation channel
Now that we have formalized the testing protocol in detail, we will justify using notation for a teleportation channel
used in the main text. That is, we will show that a teleportation channel with noisy memory acting on |ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ Φ+
can be viewed as a channel MTj acting only on |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Recall Definition 12. In a single round j of the protocol A performs a Bell measurement on the state |ψ〉〈ψ|Ainj and
her part of EPR pair. This action is described described by an operator BAinj AEPRj →M , acting on two registers on
A’s side and producing a classical message m ∈ M which is then sent to B. The initial state |ψ〉〈ψ|Ainj ⊗ Φ
+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
becomes
BAinj AEPRj →M (|ψ〉〈ψ|Ainj ⊗ Φ
+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
) = TrAinj AEPRj
[ ∑
m∈M
pmΨ
′
Ainj A
EPR
j ,m
⊗ (Um |ψ〉〈ψ|U†m)BEPRj ⊗ |m〉〈m|M ,
]
=
=
∑
m∈M
pm(Um |ψ〉〈ψ|U†m)BEPR1 ⊗ |m〉〈m|M
(B11)
where Ψ′Ainj AEPRj ,m is one of four Bell states resulting from the Bell measurement, pm ≥ 0,
∑
m pm = 1 is a probability
of an outcome m occurring. (Um |ψ〉〈ψ|U†m)BEPRj is a state on B’s register after the Bell measurement. Note that this
is simply a unitary applied to the initial state. |m〉〈m| is a classical message register, which A sends to B in order for
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him to correct the state. Next, B applies a memory MBEPRj →BEPRj to his share of the state:
MBEPRj →BEPRj ◦ BAinj AEPRj →M (|ψ〉〈ψ|Ainj ⊗ Φ
+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
) = MBEPRj →BEPRj
∑
m∈M
pm(Um |ψ〉〈ψ|U†m)BEPRj ⊗ |m〉〈m|M
(B12)
=
∑
m∈M
pmMBEPRj →BEPRj (Um |ψ〉〈ψ|U
†
m)BEPRj ⊗ |m〉〈m|M
(B13)
Upon receiving a classical message m B undoes the unitary operations to recover the teleported state. This operation
is described by a map RMBEPRj →BEPRj (·) = TrM [
∑
m Um(·)U†m ⊗ |m〉〈m|M ],
RMBEPRj →BEPRj ◦MBEPRj →BEPRj ◦ BAinj AEPRj →M (|ψ〉〈ψ|Ainj ⊗ Φ
+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
= TrM
[ ∑
m∈M
pmU
†
mMBEPRj →BEPRj (Um |ψ〉〈ψ|U
†
m)BEPRj Um ⊗ |m〉〈m|M
]
=
∑
m∈M
pmU
†
mMBEPRj →BEPRj (Um |ψ〉〈ψ|U
†
m)BEPRj Um
=
∑
m∈M
pmU†m ◦MBEPRj →BEPRj ◦ Um(|ψ〉〈ψ|) =: M
T
j (|ψ〉〈ψ|)
(B14)
Then, the test of depth κ can be described as in the main text
T κ = TAin1 AEPR[1,κ]BEPR[1,κ]F[1,κ]C[1,κ]→Boutκ
|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ⊗ κ⊗
j=1
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
⊗
∣∣∣~fκ〉〈~fκ∣∣∣
F[1,k]
⊗ |~cκ〉〈~cκ|C[1,k]
 (B15)
≡ ©κj=1Λj =©κj=1 Cj ◦MTj (|ψ〉〈ψ|) (B16)
Appendix C: Teleportation and quantum memory
1. Absorbing teleportation noise into the memory
As it is often done in the estimation literature for quantum computing, see e.g. [8–10] , we will model teleportation
as a perfect operation followed (or preceded) by noise. This will allow us to consider teleportation as a perfect
operation i.e. with perfect Bell measurement and recovery operation as well as perfect Bell pair, and absorb all the
associated noise into the quantum memory.
a. Noisy operations
Assume a Bell state measurement is followed by a local noise, BAinj AEPRj →M ≡ NB ◦ BAinj AEPRj →M . Assume further
that the recovery operation is also noisy, but in this case the map is preceded by the noise, RMBEPRj →BEPRj ≡
RMBEPRj →BEPRj ◦ NR. Looking at Definition 12 it is now clear that one can redefine M ′BEPRj →BEPRj = N
R ◦
MBEPRj →BEPRj ◦NB and use M ′ as a new memory channel.
b. Noisy Bell pair
The situation is similar for a noisy Bell pair. Assume a Bell pair is affected by local noise, i.e. teleportation
occurs on a state NAEPRj ⊗ NBEPRj
(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
. Here the maps N are mixed-unitary channels, i.e. have the form
N(·) = ∑l plUl(·)U†l , with pl being a probability and Ul a unitary. Note that this is not the most general type of
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noise, however the most common ones (e.g. depolarizing, dephasing) can be modeled this way. Moreover, note that
for an EPR pair it holds that
UAEPRj ⊗ UBEPRj
(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
= idAEPRj ⊗ UBEPRj U
T
AEPRj
(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
. (C1)
Therefore, using an explicit form of maps N and the above statement, we can write,
NAEPRj ⊗NBEPRj
(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
=
∑
l,l′
pl,l′UAEPRj ⊗ UBEPRj
(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
(C2)
=
∑
l,l′
pl,l′ idAEPRj ⊗ UBEPRj U
T
AEPRj
(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
(C3)
=: idAEPRj ⊗N
′
BEPRj
(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
(C4)
In particular, this means that noise acting on the Bell pair, which has the mixed-unitary form, can be absorbed into
the memory map,
M ′BEPRj →BEPRj ◦ BAinj AEPRj →M ◦
(
NAEPRj ⊗NBEPRj
)(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
(C5)
= M ′BEPRj →BEPRj ◦ BAinj AEPRj →M ◦
(
idAEPRj ⊗N
′
BEPRj
)(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
(C6)
= M ′BEPRj →BEPRj ◦N
′
BEPRj
◦ BAinj AEPRj →M
(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
(C7)
≡M ′′BEPRj →BEPRj ◦ BAinj AEPRj →M
(
Φ+
AEPRj B
EPR
j
)
(C8)
Appendix D: 2-designs
In this appendix we show that for the ping-pong test, the average of the probability p3|ψ,~cκ,κ over the six Pauli
states is equal to its average over the whole state space according to the Haar measure. To do so, we use the fact that
the uniform distribution over set X is a 2-design [24] and p3|ψ,~cκ,κ contains a polynomial of degree 2 in |ψ〉. Next, we
prove a similar statement when averaging over the Clifford group.
1. Pauli states
Lemma 6. Averaging the probability of success for a single execution of Test 2, p3|ψ,~cκ,κ, over Pauli states is equal
to averaging over all qubit states according to the Haar measure,
1
|X|
∑
ψ∈X
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ =
∫
dψ p3|ψ,~cκ,κ. (D1)
Proof of Lem. 2. We can write the left-hand side explicitly as,
1
|X|
∑
ψ∈X
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ =
1
|X|
∑
ψ
Tr
[
Tκ(|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ) · ©
κ
j=1Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Boutκ
]
(D2)
where we explicitly write A and B’s input and output registers. Let X,Y ∈ L(H) be linear operators over the
Hilbert space. The inner product 〈X|Y 〉 := Tr[X†Y ] is invariant ∀U : L(H) → L(H), i.e. 〈U(X)|U(Y )〉 =
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Tr
[
(U(X))† · U(Y )] = Tr[X† · Y ] = 〈X|Y 〉. Note that ©κj=1Cj is a unitary channel and therefore, we can write,
1
|X|
∑
ψ∈X
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ =
1
|X|
∑
ψ
Tr
[(©κj=1Cj)−1 ◦ Tκ(|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ) · (©κj=1Cj)−1 ◦©κj=1Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Boutκ ] (D3)
=
1
|X|
∑
ψ
Tr
[(©κj=1Cj)−1 ◦ Tκ(|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ) · |ψ〉〈ψ|Boutκ ] (D4)
Now, using Choi-Jamiolkowski theorem, see Lem. 5, we can write
1
|X|
∑
ψ∈X
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ =
1
|X|
∑
ψ
|Ain′1 |Tr
[
|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Boutκ ω
Γ
Ain
′
1 B
out
κ
]
(D5)
ωΓ
Ain
′
1 B
out
κ
is a Choi-Jamiolkowski state associated with the map
(©κj=1Cj)−1 ◦ T˜κ. It is now clear that averaging is
taken over a polynomial of degree 2 under the trace and we can use properties of a 2-design. Therefore,
1
|X|
∑
ψ∈X
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ =
∫
dψ|Ain′1 |Tr
[
|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|Boutκ ω
Γ
Ain
′
1 B
out
κ
]
(D6)
=
∫
dψTr
[
Tκ(|ψ〉〈ψ|Ain1 ) · ©
κ
j=1Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Boutκ
]
(D7)
=
∫
dψ p3|ψ,~cκ,κ (D8)
where we used Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism and properties of the trace again. We define F¯~cκ,κ =
∫
dψ p3|ψ,~cκ,kt
as the average fidelity.
2. Clifford gates
Now we will prove that averaging p3|ψ,~cκ,κ over the Clifford set reproduces averaging over the whole unitary set
taken according to the Haar measure.
Lemma 7. Averaging the probability of success for a single execution of Test 2, p3|ψ,~cκ,κ, over Pauli states and over
Clifford gates is equal to averaging over all qubit states and all 2-qubit unitary gates according to the Haar measure,
1
|X|
∑
ψ∈X
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ =
∫
dψ
∫
dC1· · ·
∫
dCκ p3|ψ,~cκ,κ. (D9)
Proof. Just like in the previous lemma, let us first use cyclicity of the trace,
LHS =
∫
dψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
Tr
[(©κj=1Cj)−1 ◦ Tκ(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|] (D10)
=
∫
dψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
Tr
[
C†1 ◦ · · · ◦ C†κ ◦ Cκ ◦MTκ ◦ Cκ−1 ◦MTκ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ C1 ◦MT1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|
]
(D11)
=
∫
dψ
1
|Cliff|κ−1
∑
C1,...,Cκ−1∈Cliff
Tr
[
C†1 ◦ · · · ◦ C†κ−1 ◦MTκ ◦ Cκ−1 ◦MTκ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ C1 ◦MT1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|
]
(D12)
=
∫
dψ
1
|Cliff|κ−1
∑
C1,...,Cκ−2∈Cliff
Tr
C†1 ◦ · · · ◦ C†κ−2
 ∑
Cκ−1∈Cliff
C†κ−1 ◦MTκ ◦ Cκ−1
 ◦MTκ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ C1 ◦MT1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|
,
(D13)
where in the last step we pulled the summation over κ − 1 under the trace. Note that
(∑
Cκ−1 Cκ−1 ◦MTκ ◦ Cκ−1
)
is an unnormalized twirl over Cliff and therefore it commutes with all Clifford gates C ∈ Cliff. By repeating pulling
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the summation under the trace, we can write,
LHS =
∫
dψ
1
|Cliff|κ−1
∑
C1,...,Cκ−3∈Cliff
Tr
C†1 ◦ · · · ◦ C†κ−3
 ∑
Cκ−2∈Cliff
C†κ−2 ◦MTκ−1 ◦ Cκ−2
 ◦
 ∑
Cκ−1∈Cliff
C†κ−1 ◦MTκ ◦ Cκ−1

(D14)
◦MTκ−2 ◦ · · · ◦ C1 ◦MT1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|
]
(D15)
=
∫
dψ
1
|Cliff|κ−1 Tr
©κ−1j=1
 ∑
Cj∈Cliff
C†j ◦MTj+1 ◦ Cj
 ◦MT1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|
. (D16)
Now we are left with a rather awkward map MT1 which is not twirled. However, since the Haar measure is invariant
under unitary transformations, for all E ∈ Cliff it holds that
LHS =
∫
dψ
1
|Cliff|κ−1 Tr
©κ−1j=1
 ∑
Cj∈Cliff
C†j ◦MTj+1 ◦ Cj
 ◦MT1 ◦ E(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · E(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
 (D17)
=
∫
dψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
E∈Cliff
Tr
©κ−1j=1
 ∑
Cj∈Cliff
C†j ◦MTj+1 ◦ Cj
 ◦MT1 ◦ E(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · E(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
 (D18)
where in the last line we used the fact that the value of the expression does not depend on E. Now, using cyclicity
of the trace and commutativity properties of E, we get
LHS =
∫
dψ
1
|Cliff|κ Tr
©κ−1j=1
 ∑
Cj∈Cliff
C†j ◦MTj+1 ◦ Cj
 ◦( ∑
E∈Cliff
E† ◦MT1 ◦ E
)
(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · (|ψ〉〈ψ|)
. (D19)
Now we can change discrete averaging to the continuous one by definition of the unitary 2-design, see Def. 8 and [25].
We have
LHS =
∫
dψ Tr
[
©κ−1j=1
(∫
dCj C
†
j ◦MTj+1 ◦ Cj
)
◦
(∫
dE E† ◦MT1 ◦ E
)
(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · (|ψ〉〈ψ|)
]
. (D20)
To get back to the expression for p3|ψ,~cκ,κ, we can invert the procedure we just applied, i.e.
LHS =
∫
dψ
∫
dE Tr
[
©κ−1j=1
(∫
dCj C
†
j ◦MTj+1 ◦ Cj
)
◦
(
E† ◦MT1 ◦ E
)
(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · (|ψ〉〈ψ|)
]
(D21)
=
∫
dψ
∫
dE Tr
[
©κ−1j=1
(∫
dCj C
†
j ◦MTj+1 ◦ Cj
)
◦MT1 ◦ E(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · E(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
]
(D22)
=
∫
dψ
∫
dE
∫
dC1· · ·
∫
dCκ−1 Tr
[
C†1 ◦ · · · ◦ C†κ−1 ◦MTκ ◦ Cκ−1 ◦MTκ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ C1 ◦MT1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|
]
(D23)
=
∫
dψ
∫
dE
∫
dC1· · ·
∫
dCκ−1 Tr
[
C†1 ◦ · · · ◦ C†κ−1 ◦ E† ◦ E ◦MTκ ◦ Cκ−1 ◦MTκ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ C1 ◦MT1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|
]
(D24)
If now we put E = Cκ we obtain the desired result. We define F¯κ =
∫
dψ
∫
dC1· · ·
∫
dCκ p3|ψ,~cκ,κ as double-averaged
fidelity.
Appendix E: Completeness and soundness
1. Exact completeness and soundness
To keep this section more compact, we use notation from the main text. That is we express Test 2 as Tκ =
©κj=1 Cj ◦MTj , see Eq. (6).
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Proof of Thm. 1. First, we prove that Test 2 is exactly correct when the winning threshold P3 = 1. That is, for honest
A and B and for any 1 ≤ κ ≤ k after κ rounds the state that the verifier obtains at output κ is ©κj=1Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|).
To prove this, we need to make sure that for all the rounds preceding κ the state at outputs j = 1, . . . , κ are
correct. The above can be proven by induction. For κ = 1 the verifier measures C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|). On the other hand,
C1 ◦MT1 = C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|), since the setup is perfect. Repeating this step inductively we get for all κ,
©κj=1 Cj ◦MTj (|ψ〉〈ψ|) =©κj=1Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|) (E1)
Hence, P3 = 1.
Before proving Thm. 2 we formally prove a known fact related to no-cloning theorem [15].
Lemma 8. Let VA→A′B be an arbitrary isometry, and let for any qubit state |ψ〉A, |Ψ〉A′B := V |ψ〉A. If for all |ψ〉,
TrB(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|A′B) = |ψ〉〈ψ|A′ , then |Ψ〉A′B = |ψ〉A′ ⊗ |junk〉B, where |junk〉 is a pure state independent of |ψ〉.
Proof. If the above is true for all |ψ〉 it is in particular true for |0〉, namely, V |0〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |σ0〉. Similarly V |1〉 =
|1〉 ⊗ |σ1〉. When now computing the action of V on the state |+〉, we have V |+〉 = |0〉⊗|σ0〉+|1〉⊗|σ1〉√2 . But since
TrB(V |+〉〈+|V †) = |+〉〈+|, we must have |σ0〉 = |σ1〉 =: |junk〉
Corollary 3. Let ΩA→A′B be an arbitrary CPTP map, and let for any qubit state |ψ〉〈ψ|A, ρA′B := Ω(|ψ〉〈ψ|A). If
for all |ψ〉, TrB(ρA′B) = |ψ〉〈ψ|A′ , then ρA′B = |ψ〉〈ψ|A′ ⊗ junkB , where junk is a state independent of |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Proof. By Stinespring dilation ∃VA→A′BE Ω(·) = TrE(V (·)V †). Since TrB(ρA′B) = |ψ〉〈ψ|A′ = trBE(V |ψ〉〈ψ|V †)
we must have by the above lemma that V |ψ〉〈ψ|V † = |ψ〉〈ψ|A′ ⊗ |junk′〉〈junk′|BE , and therefore ρA′B = |ψ〉〈ψ|A′ ⊗
TrE(|junk′〉〈junk′|BE) = |ψ〉〈ψ|A′ ⊗ junkB .
Proof of Thm. 2. Now we prove that Test 2 is exactly sound. That is, if the average probability of success P3 = 1,
then nodes A and B have the ability to correctly execute Test 2. The intuition behind our proof is that challenges
given by the verifier impose a certain structure on the provers strategy. We first show that if the nodes win the test
with probability 1, then their strategy must produce the correct state at each time step κ. Then, we argue that this
implies that the nodes must have passed the state around, and therefore use a quantum channel between them exactly
κ times.
Lemma 9. Let Q~cκ,κ be an arbitrary strategy of the provers, which can depend on the information available throughout
the protocol, i.e. depth κ and Clifford string ~cκ. If the average probability of success in Test 2 is P3 = 1, then for all
depths κ = 1, . . . , k, all Clifford strings ~cκ and all input states ψ ∈ X, Q~cκ,κ outputs the correct state.
Proof. This statement is essentially the inverse of the exact completeness statement. Let us explicitly write the average
probability of success,
P3 =
1
k
∑
κ
1
|X|
∑
ψ∈X
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ∈Cliffκ
Tr [Q~cκ,κ (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Πκ3] = 1. (E2)
This implies that for all states, gates and depths the trace must be equal to 1,
∀ψ ∈ X, ∀~cκ ∈ Cliffκ, ∀κ = 1, . . . , k : Tr [Q~cκ,κ (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Πκ3] = 1. (E3)
Therefore,
∀ψ ∈ X, ∀~cκ ∈ Cliffκ, ∀κ = 1, . . . , k : Q~cκ,κ (|ψ〉〈ψ|) = Cκ ◦ · · · ◦ C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|) (E4)
and the state at every κ must be exactly the one requested by the verifier.
Lemma 10. If the average probability of success in Test 2 is P3 = 1, then for all depths κ = 1, . . . , k, all Clifford
strings ~cκ and all input states ψ ∈ X, Q~cκ,κ uses an exact sending channel κ times and apply an operation equivalent
to the one described by ~cκ.
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Proof. In our test at every time step κ the provers must produce some state. Since at every time step a state has to
be defined, Q~cκ,κ can be described by
Q~cκ,κ =©κj=1E~cj ,j (E5)
Let ΓˆAκ−1 and ΓˆBκ−1,Bκ denote CPTP maps which act on registers of A and B respectively, and output qubit states,
and let ΓAκ−1 and ΓBκ−1,Bκ be TrBκ−1,Bκ [ΓˆAκ−1(·)] and TrAκ−1 [ΓˆBκ−1,Bκ(·)] respectively. The above fact together
with Lem. 6 and 10 implies that at time steps κ and κ− 1∫
dψTr
[E~cκ,κ ◦ Q~cκ−1,κ−1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Πκ3] = 1⇒ sup
ΓBκ−1,Bκ
∫
dψTr
[
ΓBκ−1,Bκ
(
E~cκ,κ
(
ρψ~cκ−1,κ−1
))
·Πκ3
]
= 1 (E6)∫
dψTr
[Q~cκ−1,κ−1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Πκ−13 ] = 1⇒ sup
ΓAκ−1
∫
dψTr
[
ΓAκ−1
(
ρψ~cκ−1,κ−1
)
·Πκ−13
]
= 1 (E7)
Moreover, we’ve put ρψ~cκ−1,κ−1 := Q~cκ−1,κ−1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) to denote a joint state of A and B at time step κ − 1. Observe
that for all κ, Πκ3 = Cκ ◦ · · · ◦C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|) projects onto a pure state. Therefore, for all κ, the states at output registers
κ− 1 for A, and κ for B, must be pure,
ΓBκ−1,Bκ
(
E~cκ,κ
(
ρψ~cκ−1,κ−1
))
= Cκ ◦ · · · ◦ C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Bκ (E8)
ΓAκ−1
(
ρψ~cκ−1,κ−1
)
= Cκ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Aκ−1 (E9)
Let σψ = (ΓˆAκ−1 ⊗ 1)(ρψ~cκ−1,κ−1) be the joint state of A and B at time step κ − 1, and after applying ΓˆAκ−1 on A.
Using Eq. (E9) we have that,
TrBκ−1(σ
ψ) = Cκ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Aκ−1 , (E10)
which is a pure state on A, and therefore any extension of this state has tensor product form across A and B, in
particular,
σψ = Cκ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ C1(|ψ〉〈ψ|)Aκ−1 ⊗ σBκ−1 , (E11)
where σBκ−1 is a state on B independent of ψ by Corr. 3. Therefore the (maximum) average fidelity of the state on
B’s side is,
sup
ΓBκ−1
∫
dψTr
[
ΓBκ−1
(
ρψ~cκ−1,κ−1
)
·Πκ−13
]
= sup
ΓBκ−1
∫
dψTr
[
σBκ−1 ·Πκ−13
]
= sup
ΓBκ−1
Tr
[
σBκ−1 ·
1
2
]
=
1
2
(E12)
This, together with Eq. (E6), implies that E~cκ,κ is an exact sending channel at time step κ. Since the statement holds
for all κ, the provers necessarily use the exact sending channel k times.
2. Completeness and soundness
Proof of Thm. 3. Completeness. As stated in the main text, we assume that the quality of operations is quanti-
fied by average fidelity and that at every round j the quality of operations is the same, i.e. for all j, µ¯ =∫
dψTr
[
Cj ◦MTj (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · Cj(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
]
. In the following we bound the average probability of success P3 in terms
of µ¯. Let us write P3 explicitly,
P3 =
1
k
∑
κ
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
Tr
[©κj=1Cj ◦MTj (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Π3κ] (E13)
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From Lem. 7 we have that
P3 =
1
k
∑
κ
∫
dψ
∫
dC1· · ·
∫
dCκ Tr
[(©κj=1Cj)−1 ◦©κj=1Cj ◦MTj (|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|] , (E14)
=
1
k
∑
κ
∫
dψTr
[
©κj=1
(∫
dCj C
†
j ◦MTj ◦ Cj
)
(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|
]
. (E15)
Observe that (MTj )twirl =
∫
dCj C
†
j ◦MTj ◦ Cj is a twirl of the operator MTj [26]. Furthermore, twirling any map is
equivalent to the action of a depolarizing channel, i.e. (MTj )twirl(ρ) = Dj(ρ) = pρ+ (1− p)1/2, for some parameter
p and any state ρ. Using properties of the depolarizing channel we can write,
P3 =
1
k
∑
κ
∫
dψTr
[©κj=1(MTj )twirl(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|] (E16)
=
1
k
∑
κ
∫
dψTr
[©κj=1Dj(|ψ〉〈ψ|) · |ψ〉〈ψ|] (E17)
=
1
k
∑
κ
κ∏
j=1
F¯ (Dj) (E18)
=
1
k
∑
κ
κ∏
j=1
F¯
(
(MTj )twirl
)
(E19)
(E20)
Additionally, the average fidelity of a twirled map is equal to the average fidelity of the same map without a twirl
[26], therefore, P3 =
1
k
∑
κ
∏κ
j=1 F¯
(
MTj )
)
. By assumption, ∀j F¯ (MTj ) = µ¯, and
P3 =
1
k
∑
κ
µ¯κ =
1
k
µ¯(µ¯k − 1)
k(µ¯− 1) = hk(µ¯). (E21)
If we demand that P3 ≥ t then µ¯ ≥ h−1k (t).
Proof of Thm. 4. Soundness. In the case when the nodes A and B are honest, the soundness statement is the converse
of the completeness, see the proof above. Here we prove soundness of Test 2 in the case when the nodes are dishonest
(m-cheating). Just like before, we will assume that output for a fixed κ happens at node B.
The idea behind this proof is that we bound the average probability of success of the provers when they use a
quantum channel between them, and when they do not. More specifically, let ρAoutκ−1 be a state available at A’s output
at time step κ − 1 and ρoutBκ be a state available at B’s at time step κ. We show that whenever the provers use
the channel, the average fidelity between these two states is bounded by 1. However, whenever they do not use the
channel, the average fidelity between these two states is at most as large as the average fidelity between the states
at time step κ − 1, i.e. ρAoutκ−1 and ρBoutκ−1 . This average fidelity is intrinsically bounded by the approximate cloning
theorem [16], and here takes value 56 . If the provers are m-cheating, they use the channel between at least m times. We
prove that, as a consequence, their overall average probability of winning P3 is upper-bounded by
1
k (m+
5
6 (k −m)).
When the provers are m-cheating they adapt an arbitrary strategy Qm~cκ,κ which depends on the maximum number
of channel uses m between the nodes. It can also depend on all the information available throughout the protocol, i.e.
the challenges and gates distributed by the verifier. We assume that the executions of the test are IID (independent
and identically distributed) and the probability of winning a single execution i = 1, . . . , n is expressed as
∀ ~cκ, κ, ψ p3|ψ,~cκ,κ = Tr
[Qm~cκ,κ (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Πκ3] . (E22)
The configuration of channel uses, i.e. at which time step the provers use the channel between them, does not need to
be fixed. At each execution, the provers can choose a particular strategy Qm,ν which describes a configuration ν of
channel uses between the nodes. We assume that the provers are non-adaptive and throughout an execution i their
strategy does not change. Therefore, the fact whether the provers choose to send the state or not, is independent of
the information available throughout the protocol. I.e. ν is independent of κ and ~cκ, and we have qν ≥ 0,
∑
ν qν = 1,
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such that
Qm~cκ,κ =
∑
ν
qνQm,ν~cκ,κ. (E23)
Note that there are
(
k
m
)
such strategies. Furthermore, let us define
p3|ν,ψ,~cκ,κ := Tr
[
Qm,ν~cκ,κ (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Πκ3
]
. (E24)
Let us rewrite the average probability of success, Eq. (7),
P3 =
1
2
1
k
k∑
κ=1
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ +
1
k
k∑
κ=1
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ
 . (E25)
Now, we will move the summation in the second component of the sum over κ – instead of going through (1, 2, . . . , k−
1, k) we will set it to go (k, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1),
P3 =
1
2
1
k
k∑
κ=1
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ +
1
k
k−1∑
κ=k
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ
 . (E26)
Let us define p3|ψ,~c0,0 := 1 for round κ = 0, which one can interpret as simply giving the state to node A and
immediately requesting it back. Now since for κ = k it holds that p3|ψ,~ck,k ≤ 1, we have p3|ψ,~ck,k ≤ p3|ψ,~c0,0.
Therefore,
P3 ≤ 1
2
1
k
k∑
κ=1
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ +
1
k
k−1∑
κ=0
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ
 . (E27)
Now we write the expression as a single summation,
P3 ≤ 1
k
k∑
κ=1
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ + p3|ψ,~cκ−1,κ−1
2
(E28)
=
∑
ν
qν
1
k
k∑
κ=1
1
|X|
∑
ψ
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
1
2
(
p3|ν,ψ,~cκ,κ + p3|ν,ψ,~cκ−1,κ−1
)
(E29)
=
∑
ν
qν
1
k
k∑
κ=1
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
1
2
(
F¯ν,~cκ,κ + F¯ν,~cκ−1,κ−1
)
(E30)
In line (E29) we used the linearity property of the trace, and in line (E30) we used 2-design properties of the set X
(see argument in Sec. 6) together with the fact that Qm,ν~cκ,κ does not depend on the state.
In our test at every time step κ the provers must produce some state. Since at every time step a state has to be
defined, Qm,ν~cκ,κ can be described by
Qm,ν~cκ,κ =©κj=1E
m,ν
~cj ,j
(E31)
Now our goal is to bound the probability of winning P3 if Qm,ν~cκ,κ has exactly m sending channels E , as defined in Def.
3. We will consider two cases: when the channel E is a sending channel and when it is not.
1. E is a sending channel. In this case the provers can output the correct state at both time steps, κ − 1 and κ.
Therefore, in this case we use the trivial bound that each of the fidelities is upper-bounded by 1, and
1
2
(
F¯ν,~cκ,κ + F¯ν,~cκ−1,κ−1
) ≤ 1. (E32)
2. E is not a sending channel. Consider average fidelity expressions at time steps κ and κ−1 for the same execution
i, and assume that κ is odd and output is requested at B’s side. Each of the fidelities can be upper-bounded by its
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supremum,
F¯ν,~cκ,κ =
∫
dψTr
[
Em,ν~cκ,κ ◦ Q
m,ν
~cκ−1,κ−1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Πκ3
]
(E33)
≤ sup
ΓBκ−1,Bκ
∫
dψTr
[
ΓBκ−1,Bκ
(
Em,ν~cκ,κ
(
ρm,ν,ψ~cκ−1,κ−1
))
·Πκ3
]
(E34)
and
F¯ν,~cκ−1,κ−1 =
∫
dψTr
[
Qm,ν~cκ−1,κ−1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) ·Πκ−13
]
(E35)
≤ sup
ΓAκ−1
∫
dψTr
[
ΓAκ−1
(
ρm,ν,ψ~cκ−1,κ−1
)
·Πκ−13
]
. (E36)
Here ΓAκ−1 and ΓBκ−1,Bκ denote CPTP maps which trace out additional registers of A and B and output a qubit
state. Moreover, we’ve put ρm,ν,ψ~cκ−1,κ−1 := Q
m,ν
~cκ−1,κ−1 (|ψ〉〈ψ|) to denote a joint state of A and B at time step κ− 1.
According to Def. 3 if the channel is not sending then we can bound
sup
ΓBκ−1,Bκ
∫
dψTr
[
ΓBκ−1,Bκ
(
Em,ν~cκ,κ
(
ρm,ν,ψ~cκ−1,κ−1
))
·Πκ−13
]
≤ sup
ΓBκ−1
∫
dψTr
[
ΓBκ−1
(
ρm,ν,ψ~cκ−1,κ−1
)
·Πκ3
]
(E37)
and hence,
1
2
(
F¯ν,~cκ,κ + F¯ν,~cκ−1,κ−1
) ≤ 1
2
(
sup
ΓBκ−1
∫
dψTr
[
ΓBκ−1
(
ρm,ν,ψ~cκ−1,κ−1
)
·Πκ−13
]
+ sup
ΓAκ−1
∫
dψTr
[
ΓAκ−1
(
ρm,ν,ψ~cκ−1,κ−1
)
·Πκ−13
])
(E38)
The right-hand side of the above equation is bounded by 56 due to the approximate cloning theorem [16]. Therefore,
we have
1
2
(
F¯ν,~cκ,κ + F¯ν,~cκ−1,κ−1
) ≤ 5
6
. (E39)
There are at most k − m time steps κ = 1, . . . , k such that the channel E is not sending. Therefore, using Eqs.
(E32) and (E39) we can write (E30)
P3 ≤
∑
ν
qν
1
k
k∑
κ=1
1
|Cliff|κ
∑
~cκ
F¯ν,~cκ,κ + F¯ν,~cκ−1,κ−1
2
(E40)
≤
∑
ν
qν
1
k
(
m · 1 + (k −m) · 5
6
)
(E41)
=
1
k
(
m+
5
6
(k −m)
)
(E42)
where in the last line we used the fact that
∑
ν qν = 1.
Appendix F: Other proofs
In this appendix we present remaining proofs from Sec. V C. First we prove two statements about expected value
of the rate of wins and average fidelity. Then we calculate the probability that our consistency check is satisfied.
Finally, we derive a bound on the performance of k-round protocols in terms of double-average fidelity.
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1. Proof of Lem. 2
Here we prove that the expected value of rate R~cκ,κ, for specific depth κ and string of Clifford gates ~cκ, is equal to
fidelity F¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ) averaged over the state space.
Proof of Lem. 2. By definition, the expected value of vi~cκ,κ as,
E
[
vi~cκ,κ
]
X
=
1
|X|
∑
ψ
(
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ · 1 + p7|ψ,~cκ,κ · 0
)
=
1
|X|
∑
ψ
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ (F1)
From the 2-design properties of set X, Lem. 6, we have that
E
[
vi~cκ,κ
]
X
=
∫
dψ p3|ψ,~cκ,κ = F¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ) (F2)
By linearity property of expected value,
E
[∑
i
vi~cκ,κ
]
X
=
∑
i
E
[
vi~cκ,κ
]
X
=
∑
i
F¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ) = n~cκ,κF¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ). (F3)
And therefore,
E [R~cκ,κ]X = E
[∑
i v
i
~cκ,κ
n~cκ,κ
]
X
= F¯~cκ,κ(T˜κ) (F4)
2. Proof of Lem. 3
Here we present a proof that is analogous to the previous one, and shows that expected value of rate Rκ for a fixed
depth κ, is equal to double-average fidelity.
Proof of Lem. 3. By definition, the expected value E
[
viκ
]
X,Cliff
as
E
[
viκ
]
X,Cliff
=
1
|Cliff|κ
1
|X|
∑
C1,...,Cκ∈Cliff
∑
ψ∈X
(
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ · 1 + p7|ψ,~cκ,κ · 0
)
(F5)
=
1
|Cliff|κ
1
|X|
∑
C1,...,Cκ∈Cliff
∑
ψ∈X
p3|ψ,~cκ,κ (F6)
By 2-design properties of the Clifford set, Lem. 7, we have that
E
[
viκ
]
X,Cliff
=
∫
dψ
∫
C1· · ·
∫
Cκ p3|ψ,~cκ,κ = F¯ (T˜κ). (F7)
Since E [Rκ]X,Cliff =
∑nκ
i E[v
i
κ]X,Cliff
nκ
, with nκ being a total number of executions for a fixed κ, we have that E [Rκ]X,Cliff =
F¯κ(T˜κ).
3. Proof of Cor. 2
Next, we prove that the consistency check, Thm. 5, is satisfied with a certain probability, determined by the
estimates on the performance of individual devices.
Proof of Cor. 2. The probability that the bound (22) is satisfied is equal to probability that all the individual bounds
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are satisfied, i.e. Pr
[(∧κ
j=1
(
|rMTj − F¯ (M˜Tj )| > MTj ∧ |rCj − F¯ (C˜j)| > Cj
))]
. This is equal to
Pr
 κ∧
j=1
(
|rMTj − F¯ (M˜
T
j )| > MTj ∧ |rCj − F¯ (C˜j)| > Cj
) = (F8)
= 1− Pr
 κ∨
j=1
(
|rMTj − F¯ (M˜
T
j )| ≤ MTj ∨ |rCj − F¯ (C˜j)| ≤ Cj
) . (F9)
Since Pr[A ∨B] ≤ Pr[A] + Pr[B], we can write that
Pr
 κ∨
j=1
(
|rMTj − F¯ (M˜
T
j )| ≤ MTj ∨ |rCj − F¯ (C˜j)| ≤ Cj
) ≤ (F10)
≤
κ∑
j=1
Pr
[
|rMTj − F¯ (M˜
T
j )| ≤ MTj
]
+ Pr
[
|rCj − F¯ (C˜j)| ≤ Cj
]
(F11)
≤ 2
κ∑
j=1
(
e
−2nCj 2Cj + e
−2n
MT
j
2
MT
j
)
(F12)
where in the last line we used Hoeffding inequality, Eq. (12) and (13). Hence, we can write that
Pr
[(∧κ
j=1
(
|rMTj − F¯ (M˜Tj )| > MTj ∧ |rCj − F¯ (C˜j)| > Cj
))]
≥ 1− 2∑κj=1(e−2nCj 2Cj + e−2nMTj 2MTj ).
4. Proof of Thm. 6
Here we prove our bound on the performance of k-round protocols in terms of winning rate Rκ in Test 2. The core
of this theorem is the following lemma, which relates the diamond distance between the ideal and real implementation
of a k-round protocol, and the double-average fidelity.
Lemma 11. The performance of a k-round protocol can be bounded by the double-averaged fidelity in the following
way
‖ P˜k − Pk ‖≤ 2
√
d(d+ 1)|Cliff|k
(
1− F¯ (P˜k)
)
(F13)
where d is the dimension of the underlying Hilbert space, and |Cliff| is a size of the Clifford group for dimension d.
Proof of Lem. 11. To prove the inequality from Lem. 11 one needs to show dependence between F¯~gk(P˜k) and F¯ (P˜k).
In particular, to preserve the direction of inequality we want that F¯~gk(P˜k) ≥ F¯ (P˜k). Firstly, we trivially have that
F¯~gk(P˜k) ≥ min
~gk
F¯~gk(P˜k) (F14)
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On the other hand,
F¯ (P˜k) =
∫
dG1· · ·
∫
dGkF¯~gk(P˜k) (F15)
=
∫
dC1· · ·
∫
dCkF¯~ck(P˜k) (F16)
=
1
|Cliff|k
∑
~ck∈Cliff
F¯~ck(P˜k) (F17)
=
1
|Cliff|k
F¯~cmink (P˜k) + ∑
~ck 6=~cmink
F¯~ck(P˜k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
 (F18)
≤ 1|Cliff|k F¯~cmink (P˜
k) + 1− 1|Cliff|k = 1−
1
|Cliff|k
(
1− F¯~cmink (P˜
k)
)
, (F19)
where in lines (F16) and (F17) we used Lem. 7, and in line (F18) we separated the minimum element out of the
summation and in line (F19) we bounded each element under the sum by 1.
Now let us relate the minimum over the Clifford group to a minimum over the whole unitary group. Note that the
Clifford group rotated by any unitary U remains a Clifford group. Therefore, let us rotate every Cj by a constant
Uj , j = 1, . . . , k, such that the minimum over the Clifford sets corresponds to the minimum over the whole unitary
group. Let us write ~uk = U1, . . .Uk,
F¯~uk~cminκ (P˜k) = min~gk F¯~gk(P˜
k). (F20)
We obtain
F¯ (P˜k) ≤ 1− 1|Cliff|k
(
1−min
~gk
F¯~gk(P˜k)
)
(F21)
and so
‖ P˜k − Pk ‖≤ 2
√
d(d+ 1)
√
|Cliff|k
(
1− F¯ (P˜k)
)
. (F22)
Now we will relate the double-average fidelity of a k-round protocol to the double-average fidelity of the test. Indeed,
we will show that these quantities are equal.
Lemma 12. Double-averaged fidelity of a k-round protocol P˜k of depth k is equal to double averaged fidelity of the
test T˜κ of the same depth, κ = k,
F¯ (P˜k) = F¯ (T˜κ) (F23)
Proof. As stated in the main text, the proof of this lemma follows from noticing that the expression for double-averaged
fidelity contains only polynomials of degree 2 in every Clifford gate Cj . Therefore, here averaging over the Clifford
group is equivalent to averaging over the entire unitary group, since the Clifford group forms a 2-design. Furthermore,
the equality is possible, since we have put MTj ≡ Mj ◦ Ej , and MTj encompasses operations associated with sending
and storing the qubit.
The above two lemmas, combined with the Hoeffding bound on Rκ, Eq. 21 complete the proof Thm. 6.
Appendix G: Q-qubit protocols
In this section we provide a description of a Q-qubit extension of our class of protocols. The structure of our
description is exactly the same as the one from Section III A with the difference that all the operations are carried
out on more than one qubit.
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In a Q-qubit k-round protocol nodes have a total of Q qubits available. At each round j = 1, . . . , k of the protocol
nodes A and B can send any subset of the local qubits to one another. We denote all of the sending operations in
round j by Ej . Moreover, the nodes can store local qubits in the quantum memory and apply local gates. We denote
these operations by M
(qj)
Aj
and G
(qj)
Aj
for node A, and G
(Q−qj)
Bj
and M
(Q−qj)
Bj
for node B. Here qj and Q − qj denote
the number of local qubits at A or B’s side at round j, respectively, after the sending operation Ej . Therefore, we
describe a Q-qubit k-round protocol can with a map
Pk,(Q) =©kj=1
[ (
G
(qj)
Aj
◦M (qj)Aj
)
⊗ (G1)
⊗
(
G
(Q−qj)
Bj
◦M (Q−qj)Bj
) ]
◦ Ej (G2)
In the presence of noise, we assume the following noise model for Q-qubit k-round protocols:
• the noise on gates is independent of the applied gate;
• the noise from memories, gates and transmission channels acts individually on each qubit;
• for each round j, the qubits are submitted to the same kind of noise on node A and node B (noise can differ
from round to round).
Formally, we assume the following
M˜
(qj)
Aj
= M˜
⊗qj
j , M˜
(Q−qj)
Bj
= M˜
⊗Q−qj
j
G˜
(qj)
Aj
= G
(qj)
Aj
◦N⊗qjj , G˜(Q−qj)Bj = G
(qj)
Bj
◦N⊗Q−qjj
(G3)
A bipartite Q-qubit, k-round protocol between any two nodes A and B consists of the following operations:
1. Local preparation of Q perfect qubit states, |ψ〉A ∈ D(H⊗qA ) and |ψ〉B ∈ D(H⊗Q−qB ). Here the superscript denotes
the number of qubits on A’s or B’s side.
2. Sending any subset of local qubits from node A to node B and vice versa. We denote all exchanging of qubits
in a round j by Ej
3. Storing all local qubits, M
(q)
A = M
⊗q
A , where MA ∈ U(HA), and M (Q−q)B = M⊗Q−qA , where MB ∈ U(HB).
Again, the superscript denotes the number qubits on A or B’s side. Storage can take up to ktM , where tM is
time necessary for creating one Bell pair and communicating classically between two most distant nodes. A noisy
memory is denoted by a tilde, M˜
(q)
A and accordingly for B.
4. Applying an arbitrary local operation by any node on any subset of local qubits. We describe this operation
by a unitary gate G
(q)
A ∈ U(H⊗qA ) and G(Q−q)B ∈ U(H⊗Q−qA ). G˜(q)A = G(q)A ◦N (q)A denotes the noisy counterpart,
where G
(q)
A is a perfect gate and N
(q)
A = N
⊗q
A is a noise map independent of the applied gate. Similarly for gates
on B’s side. Applying any gate takes a known finite time ` tM .
5. Local measurement of all local qubits at the end of the protocol, Π
(q)
A ∈ Proj(H⊗qA ) and Π(Q−q)B ∈ Proj(H⊗Q−qB ).
As stated before, we assume that the measurement can be performed perfectly.
Steps 2. – 4. are performed in rounds j = 1, ..., kP a total of k times. We denote memories and gates that are used
by A and B at a j-th round by M
(qj)
Aj
, G˜
(qj)
Aj
and M
(Q−qj)
Bj
, G˜
(Q−qj)
Bj
respectively. Such a protocol operates on a total
number of Q qubits. Note that we model noise map as a product for each of Q qubits.
Definition 15 (k-round protocols). Let H⊗Q be the Hilbert space of a two-partite quantum network. We define a
k-round protocol as a CPTP map of the form Π(Q) ◦ P˜k,(Q) ◦ Prep(Q), where:
• Prep(Q) corresponds to preparation of Q local qubits |ψ〉A ∈ D(H⊗q1A ) and |ψ〉B ∈ D(H⊗Q−q1B ) (Step 1.).
• P˜k,(Q) is a map describing k rounds of local operations – memories and gates, as well as sending qubits from A
to B (Step 2. – 4.),
P˜k,(Q) =©kPj=1
[ (
G˜
(qj)
Aj
◦M (qj)Aj
)
⊗
(
G˜
(Q−qj)
Bj
◦M (Q−qj)Bj
) ]
◦ Ej . (G4)
• Π(q)A ⊗Π(Q−q)B is a local measurement of all the local qubits. (Step 5.)
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Now let us describe a test that certifies the above functionality. It is a straightforward extension of the ping-pong
test we have discussed before. The idea of the Q-qubit teleportation-based ping-pong test is instead of teleporting a
single qubit, to teleport all Q qubits back and forth between nodes A and B and sample a random Q-qubit Clifford
gate (Cliff(2Q)) at line 3: of Test 2. The initial state of Q qubits |ψ〉〈ψ|(Q) is chosen uniformly at random from a
2-design of Q-qubit states. In this case the test can be described with a map
T κ,(Q) =©κj=1C(Q)j ◦MT (Q)j , (G5)
where, as before, the parity of j indicates on which side all the qubits are, and M
T (Q)
j ≡ M (Q)j ◦ Ej accounts for
operations associated with transmission (here teleportation). Note that M
T (Q)
j can still be written in the product
form, i.e. acting individually on each qubit, since we have assumed that M
(Q)
j and Ej are both in the product form.
Therefore, in the presence of noise, we employ the same model as for k-round Q-qubit protocols, i.e. M˜
T (Q)
j = (M˜
T
j )
⊗Q
and C˜
(Q)
j = C
(Q)
j ◦N⊗Qj .
Based on the average fidelity estimate of this test r(T˜ κ,(Q)) one can, again, check whether memories and gates
were used together by satisfying an analog of the bound (22). This can be done provided one has access to
estimates of quality of memories F¯ (M˜
(Q)
j ) =
∫
dψ(Q) Tr
[
(M˜Tj )
⊗Q(|ψ〉〈ψ|(Q)) · |ψ〉〈ψ|(Q)
]
and gates F¯ (N
(Q)
j ) =∫
dψ(Q) Tr
[
N⊗Qj (|ψ〉〈ψ|(Q)) · |ψ〉〈ψ|(Q)
]
, for all j. Note that here we necessarily use the fidelity of M˜
(Q)
j and N
(Q)
j
evaluated on the space of all Q-qubit states.
Now we can extend Thm. 6 onto Q-qubit protocols using the noise assumptions on the class of protocols. We arrive
at the following statement.
Theorem 7 (Bounding the behavior of Q-qubit k-round protocols). Given the noise model is the same for all Q qubits
at each round j, the performance of any Q-qubit Q-qubit k-round protocol, can be bounded in terms of an estimate for
the double-averaged fidelity R(T˜ κ,(Q)) of the Q-qubit test in the following way
‖ P˜k,(Q) − Pk,(Q) ‖≤
≤ 2
√
d(d+ 1)
∑
κ
√
|Cliff(d)|κ
(
1−R(T˜ κ,(Q))
) (G6)
where d = 2q is the dimension of the underlying Hilbert space, and |Cliff(d)| is a size of the Clifford group for dimension
d.
The proof of that statement is analogous to the single-qubit case, with the difference that here one uses the properties
of the unitary 2-design given by the Clifford group of dimension 2Q.
